




STATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE TRADING:









STATE ACCOUNTABILITY AND STATE TRADING:
NEED AND PROSPECTS FOR REGULARIZING
WORLD SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. POLICIES
By
Howard Roger Warwick, Jr.
B.S. 1959 University of Houston
LL.B. 1962 Southern Methodist University
A Thesis submitted to
the Faculty of
The Lav; School of the National Law Center
of the George Washington University in
partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Laws in
public International and Comparative Lav;
September 30, 1969.
Thesis directed by









I. DEFINITION OF THF PROBLEM 1
Scope of Inquiry - 1
Practical Importance of the Problem - 3
Principal Issues - 5
Central legal policy issue: governmental
accountability vs. protection of govern-
mental activities (5)—Disparate policy
objectives of participants (7)—National-
istic character of the law (9)
II. FORMATION OF N0R2-IS OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY ..... 13
Growth of State Accountability
in Domestic Arenas - 14
Civil law countries (14)—Common law
countries (17)—Soviet Union (20)
Extension of Domestic Norms into
the International Arena - 21
Formulation of absolutist policies (21)
—Shaping of restrictive policies (25)
—Effects of growth of state trading (28)
III. APPRAISAL OF THE COMPETING JURIDICAL POLICIES .... 35
Insupportability of the Absolute Concept - 35
Community interests perspective (35)
—Social values perspective (37)
—Foreign relations perspective (38)
Problems Concerning the Restrictive Concept - 41
Limitations from a democratic perspec-




Policies for Regularizing States* Immunities - 49
Need for regularization (49)
—Alternative modes for regu-
larization (51)
IV. CODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIVE IMMUNITY POLICIES .... 57
Potential Usefulness of Codification - 57
Appraisal of Past Codification Efforts - 59
Brussels Convention (59)—Continuing
interest in codification (62)—Terri-
torial Sea Convention (63)
Prospective Roles of the Major Participants - 65
Leading Western countries (65)
—Soviet Union (68)
V. APPRAISAL OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE
RESTRICTIVE CONCEPT 70
Identification of Soviet Special Interests - 70
Soviet Concessions to Western Demands - 73
Trade delegations (73)—State trading
corporations (77)—Arbitration Agree-
ments (78)
Prospects for Further Concessions - 80
VI. OUTLOOK FOR AN EFFECTIVE CONSENSUS 84
Projections on Current Trends:
Summary and Conclusions - 84
The minimal effective order (84)
—Optimal order (88)





DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM
A. SCOPE OF INQUIRY
The general problem of whether and to what extent the
activities of the government of one nation-state should be held
immune from the judicial authority and processes of another
state in connection with private suits has been a recurrent and
troublesome one within the whole community during the last
century. The problem is presently unresolved on a comprehensive
scale.
The difficulty and the importance acquired by the problem
can be attributed mainly to the conflicting demands reflected
in two momentous social trends which have advanced in the world
during the century and which have collided in reference to
claims pertaining to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. One of
these trends, the general growth of respect for the rule of law,
which is characterized by concomitant demands that governments
conduct their affairs in a manner which accords due regard to
the private rights of individuals and that governments be
charged with accountability before the law for damages inflicted
by them to private claimants in derogation of the latters
•
rights, can be viewed as an effort to develop ideals of respon-
1

sible exercise of governmental authority.
The other trend, the expansion of governmental partici-
pation in commercial enterprise and the commitment of a signifi-
cant number of countries to large-scale state trading, has
resulted in strong countervailing demands reflecting desire on
part of some countries to protect their state enterprises
from foreign interference or to secure for them a competitive
advantage. Such demands have come to be associated primarily,
though not exclusively, with the vast state trading systems
of the communist states.
Although the general problem thus posed presents for
reconciliation some mutually antagonistic sets of demands, there
is basis for belief that the problem is nevertheless capable
of being resolved satisfactorily in time through efforts of
major participants to reassess their presently disparate
interest identifications and policy objectives which bear on
sovereign immunity issues.
It is therefore the purpose of this study to examine in
relevant historical and practical contexts the divergent
interests and policy goals which are involved in sovereign
immunity claims, to appraise in those contexts the rationality
and consequentiality of such claims, and to identify the common
interests and objectives of the major participants which may be
maximized by them toward the end of achieving effective agree-
ment among states in regard to sovereign immunity policies.

B. PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM
Mere reference to the voluminous table of cases con-
tained in one of the more comprehensive surveys of international
decisions concerning sovereign immunity would serve to fairly
illustrate the immense proportions which the problem of
sovereign immunity has assumed in the world community and the
breadth of the concern which it has generated.
The bulk of the decisions pertain to the immunities of
state-owned or state-controlled organizations, instrumental-
ities or property connected with activities which can be under-
stood to have some degree of commercial character. Although
the sovereign immunity issues which the past decisions have
involved have thus far defied attempts to generally resolve
them, state participation in international commerce is increasing,
The volume of international trade carried on by the established
state trading countries, particularly the Soviet Bloc countries,
has continually grown during the past two decades, and there
can be observed to be trends toward expansion of trade relations
between the private trading systems of the West and the state
trading systems of the East. The likelihood of continued
expansion of East-West trade relations seems practically
assured by indications of increased cooperation and interdepend-
ence in other matters of common concern to the East and the
West. Moreover, new instances of nationalization of private
enterprises on part of less developed countries are currently
reported with considerable frequency. Forecasts for intensifi-

cation of trading contracts between private traders and state
traders are inescapable and lead logically to projections of
increased opportunities for sovereign immunity conflicts to
arise in the future.
Even apart from other aspects of international commerce,
the likelihood of increasingly frequent sovereign immunity
conflicts arising from maritime contacts alone is great. A
large proportion of sovereign immunity controversies in the past
has been concerned with the immunities of governments'
commercial vessels. Such controversies have arisen not only
in respect to claims arising out of operations of the vessels
themselves, but they have frequently arisen from attempts to
attach vessels in order to vest jurisdiction for the prosecution
of suits on unrelated claims against the vessels' governmental
owners, or as security for the payment of such claims. Con-
troversies of both types seem likely to increase commensurately
with increasing numbers of government-owned vessels partici-
pating in international commerce.
Furthermore, continually increasing requirements of
populations to obtain resources from the sea combine with
advances in ocean science and technology to give assurance that
increasing numbers of government-owned vessels will be engaged
in commercial fishing and mineral extraction activities in the
future. This will also increase the possibility of government-
owned commercial vessels entering the territories of foreign
states where they might be subjected to the prosecution of
private claims.
In short, governmental participation in international

commercial transactions, and governmental operation of vessels
for commercial purposes, both prolific sources of sovereign
immunity conflicts in the past, promise to be of even greater
importance in this respect in the future. This points to a
compelling need to resolve the problem of sovereign immunity on
a comprehensive global scale at an early date.
C. PRINCIPAL ISSUES
1. Central Legal Policy Issue: Governmental
Accountability Vs. Protection of
Governmental Activities
One concept of the doctrine of sovereign immunity which
has been widely followed in the international community is that
the government of one state has virtually absolute immunity from
suit without its consent in the courts of another state. This
concept, descriptively referred to as the "absolute concept"
of sovereign immunity, might have been the predominant norm
of the world community a century ago, and it possibly still
3
expresses the international practices of a majority of states.
The most rational justifications which have been advanced for
it have been the alleged need of states to protect governmental
functions from private and foreign interference on a mutual
basis and the desire to avoid foreign relations friction.
The absolute concept of sovereign immunity has been
qualified in a significant number of states during the past
century, however, principally in most Western European countries
and more recently in the United States. This has been done by

the adoption of versions of the so-called "restrictive concept"
of sovereign immunity whereby immunity is denied to foreign
governments in some important classes of civil suits. The
classes of cases in which immunity is thus withheld can he said
with considerable generalization to comprise suits by private
claimants for damages attributable to foreign governments
•
acts which are of a substantially commercial character. 4 In
the states where the restrictive concept has been followed it
was adopted largely as an answer to juridical complications
which have been entailed by the evolution of state trading,
and an important consequence of its adoption is that immunity
can be denied almost categorically in respect to private claims
arising from state trading transactions.
In view of this, it is hardly surprising to find that the
restrictive concept has been most strongly resisted, and the
absolute concept most strongly defended, by states which engage
extensively in state trading, particularly the Soviet Union and
the Eastern European Communist Bloc countries. Irrespective
of cold war implications which have given impetus to the
Western trend toward restrictive immunity policies and which
7
even now serve to help perpetuate a division of views, the
trend toward the restrictive concept is recognized as being
fundamentally grounded upon concern for private persons who
p
suffer injury as result of wrongful governmental action.
Contemporary social policy in both the West and the East
would tend to support popular expectations that governments be
required to act responsibly toward individuals and, failing
this, that they be held accountable in most matters before

judicial institutions. Trends toward the permissibility of
suits against governments in their domestic courts operate to
bolster expectations that the domestic courts also provide
forums for adjudication of suits against foreign governments.
From the Western point of view, these expectations are further
strengthened in suits arising from state trading transactions,
for in such cases these claims can be reinforced with a claim
pointing to the essential fairness of treating governmental
traders equally before the law with the private Western traders
with which the former have elected to compete in world commerce.
It is a curious fact, however, that in a number of
states immunity is still granted to foreign governmental defend-
ants as to classes of claims upon which the respective forum
governments would themselves be amenable in their own courts.
This would normally be the case in the United Kingdom for
example, or in the Soviet Union, and it appears that this
sometimes still results as an aberration in the United States. -1-
Though it might be amply rationalized on other substantial
grounds, such a result would not appear to be readily defensible
on grounds of sound public policy.
2. Disparate Policy Objectives
of Participants
It can be observed that an East-West polarization of
views exists in regard to sovereign immunity policies and that
there are significant cold war implications of the problem.
Those implications pervade all aspects of sovereign immunity
in the international arena, and they may be of crucial impor-

8tance to resolving the problem on a general scale.
Deeply involved in the sovereign immunity problem is an
East-West contest between state enterprise and private enter-
prise. The state trading systems of the Soviet Bloc countries
and the private trading systems of the Western states are both
indispensable bases of national power of their exponents. if
the two systems are to coexist in peaceful competition, then
juridical equality between the two would seem to be necessary.
In the first place, there appears to be no rational
basis for differentiating between the risks and liabilities to
which the enterprises of the respective systems should be sub-
jected upon entering into commercial transactions for gain.
Although it can be claimed that it makes a difference if the
anticipated gain would benefit a whole public rather than a mere
few individuals, there is fundamentally a functional identity
between the organs of trade in both the private trading and
state trading systems. Nor does there appear to be rational
basis for differentiating between the moral responsibilities
of competing enterprises to compensate for injuries which they
inflict upon private persons in the course of their activities.
Furthermore, the maintenace of competitive equality may
be essential to the fact of continued coexistence of the state
12
and private enterprise systems. State trading has some
inherent competitive advantages over private trading in that the
former can be systematized by a nation to provide its trading
organs with greater bargaining power, greater flexibility, and
13
virtual freedom from interference by domestic interests.
The creation of additional advantages , such as immunity from

suit, may make it even more difficult for private traders to
compete
.
It is axiomatic that private trade is the foundation of
the Western economic system and that the Western nations have
an urgent need to protect it from the competing system. This
reasoning has clearly motivated the U.S. State Department to
15
adopt the restrictive concept as its normal policy. It is
equally obvious that the Soviet Bloc states have an interest
in preserving their standing to claim judicial immunity for
their commercial organs and property in order to protect the
instruments of their system of foreign trade. It would seem to
be advantageous from the Soviet point of view for it to maintain
that position so long as its trade objectives are inseparably
connected with its political, military, and ideological cold
1 ft
war objectives, but any such advantage might prove to be
illusory if and when the Soviet Union commits itself to com-
peting in international trade primarily for economic gain.
3. Nationalistic Character of the Law
There are no international judicial forums having compe-
1 7tence to adjudicate suits by private plaintiff s , and there
has been no effective general treaty practice concerning the
immunities of national governments and their property and
vessels from the exercise of foreign judicial jurisdiction in
civil suits. Instead, the law of sovereign immunity as it has
operated in the international sphere has been predominantly
effected by unilateral policy pronouncements of national

10
decision-makers, mainly judges and foreign relations officials,
often deciding on an ad hoc basis.
The subject is estimated to have produced a greater
volume of municipal law decisions than any other subject of
18
international legal concern. The frequency with which inter-
national sovereign immunity claims have arisen in national
courts, together with the tendency of decision-makers to resolve
them on the basis of national comparisons rather than by inter-
19
national criteria, helps to account for what appears on the
whole to be an essentially nationalistic approach to the
formulation of sovereign immunity policies.
The problem of the judicial immunities to be accorded
to foreign governments can rationally be understood to
constitute merely the external side of a fundamental policy
issue which has arisen within both the internal and external
arenas of states, i.e., whether and to v/hat extent any govern-
ment, domestic or foreign, should be permitted to avoid judicial
accountability to private claimants for harm attributable to
its activities.
The policies to be adopted by a state to resolve the
problem in its internal arena are shaped entirely by the local
social, political, and economic value factors which are brought
to bear on decision-makers through internal political processes.
Examples of such local factors include the prevalent local
ideals concerning individual rights and governmental respon-
sibility, public fiscal considerations, and demands for protec-
tion of local private interests. These factors operate also in
respect to the external side of a state's sovereign immunity

11
policies, but there the matter is further complicated by the
addition of foreign relations interests and international
legal policy considerations. Because clear and rational
international legal policy pronouncements concerning sovereign
immunity have heretofore been lacking, states have been free
to devise their own external immunity policies in accordance
with their individual local value and foreign relations
perspectives
.
National decision-makers have been hard put to accommodate
the important interests involved in sovereign immunity contro-
versies concerning foreign governments. Within most states,
demands for individual justice and governmental accountability
have combined with the political and economic implications of
the conflict between state enterprise and private enterprise
to form strong bases for objection to the application of the
absolute concept of sovereign immunity. On the other hand,
demands of state traders for the protection of their instruments
of trade, backed by tacit threat of economic, political, or
legal retaliation, are considerations which are too substantial
to be ignored by even the most idealistic states in view of
the major role now played by state trading countries in every
phase of international intercourse.
The varying ways in which states have attempted to
accommodate or adjust the interests involved in these competing
claims have produced results which on the whole have been
disorganized and which sometimes have been eccentric. There
is today no obligatory general rule of international law
pertaining to foreign civil jurisdictional immunities of

12
governments. This state of affairs is conducive neither to the
promotion of international commercial intercourse nor to the




FORMATION OF NORMS OF
STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
Relevant historical and social value perspectives
validate the principle of judicial accountability of governments
and substantially support its applicability in both the internal
and external arenas of an overwhelming consensus of states.
In the historical perspective, it can be seen that the
recognition of the concept of the substantial accountability
of a government in its domestic courts antedated by a period
of many centuries the development of formal concepts of
absolute immunity of sovereigns to their internal judicial
processes. Nevertheless, the latter appear to have been almost
universally controlling for several centuries, and they were
still prevalent in the early nineteenth century when the idea
of the judicial immunities of sovereigns began to be tested in
the international sphere. Thus, absolute immunity constituted
the juridical frame of reference for the initial international
decisions on sovereign immunity questions.
Since the time of the initial introduction of absolutist
immunity policies into the international arena the juridical
reference frame has changed, and absolutist policies no longer




economic and political interests of most states. Democratic
ideals have since grown throughout most of the world community,
and governments more and more have become conceived of as the
servants, not the masters, of the people. Since governmental
immunity can be recognized as basically inconsistent with
democratic institutions, it has been ameliorated in the internal
spheres of most states by restricting the immunities of the
domestic governments and making them accountable in a substantial
measure, but not completely, in their courts. The policy of
substantial governmental accountability has thus become
established as the prevalent norm in the domestic arenas of the
world community, and the tendency of states during this century
has been to extend this policy into the international arena.
A « GROWTH OF STATE ACCOUNTABILITY
IN DOMESTIC ARENAS
1. Civil Law Countries
Contemporary policies of governmental accountability
among the civil law countries have largely resulted from the
influence of the Roman law. In classical Roman law, the
settlement of commercial disputes involving the state could
be effected only by administrative procedures, and neither
of the Roman treasuries, the aerarium , or public treasury,
nor the fiscus , or imperial treasury, was initially subject
to the processes of the private law.
The Emperor, however, as a natural person, could be
subject to the private law, and in late periods of the Roman
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Empire the fiscus absorbed the aerarium and enabled the former
to participate extensively in commerce. At about that time
the state acknowledged the responsibility of the fiscus in
accordance with the private law in respect to its commercial
22 23
activities, and its property relationships. The Roman
state thus became suable in its courts in respect to its
commercial and proprietary functions, but the state's political
and governmental functions remained beyond the pale of the
private law.
Though it was supplanted by absolutist concepts of
sovereign immunity during the Holy Roman Empire and in the
feudal monarchies of the middle ages, the Roman example was
eventually revived in the law of Continental Europe during
the course of the nineteenth century. There it was combined
with early Germanic law principles which emphasized the rights
of individuals against governmental authority, and with natural
law theories, to furnish a normative background which has
inclined most civil law countries toward judicially enforcing
25governmental responsibility in respect to private rights.
During the nineteenth century a relatively advanced
concept of governmental accountability evolved widely on the
continent of Europe and in Latin America, In most of these
countries the governments remained immune in respect to their
political and governmental functions, but they generally
became liable in their own courts under ordinary rules of
private law in regard to their ,,fiscal ,, relations, i.e., their
public and private proprietary relationships and their
27
relationships when exercising corporate functions. Implemen-

16
tation of this concept has varied considerably among these
countries, however, and the test has been difficult to apply,
especially in borderline cases.
Principles of governmental accountability developed
somewhat differently and more thoroughly in France than in
other civil law countries. In France, as in most of the rest
of Europe, the absolutist concept of immunity of the sovereign
had developed along with the concept of sovereignty itself
28during the medieval period of personal monarchies. In
France, as in most other European countries, the standard of
governmental responsibility which is said to have prevailed
29
was the "principle of complete irresponsibility." "As the
fountainhead power and justice, the monarch was invested with
a type of sovereignty which excluded responsibility as to his
30
acts or those acting on his behalf." In the latter nineteenth
century, France, rejecting the Romanic theories of its neighbors,
began to develop on rational grounds an inordinately liberal
standard of governmental accountability in respect to private
citizens injured through operations of the domestic government.
Dismissing outmoded theories of sovereignty and emphasizing
instead the function of the state as a performer of services
3]for the public need, the administrative courts of France
finally fabricated a blanket rule of strict liability of the
32
state, both as to contracts and to torts. Subject only to
proof of damages and causation, the public, as beneficiary
of governmental actions, is deemed to have an absolute respon-
sibility to relieve the damaged individual of his dispropor-





The maxim that the 'King can do no wrong, ' has
been superseded [in France] by the saying that 'the
State is an honest man. ' As such, it will seek to
repair the damages caused by its wrongful acts and
will not seek to avoid liability by taking refuge
behind the fictitious dogma of sovereignty. 34
2. Common Law Countries
The French example stands in sharp contrast with the
arduously slow implementation of the principle of governmental
accountability within the Anglo-American system. The absolutist
concept of immunity of the domestic sovereign had become estab-
lished in England as a formal principle of the common law in
the sixteenth century, -" and it was there expressed, as it was
in the ancient regime of France, in the maxim, "The King can
do no wrong." The eighteenth century conception of the immunity
of the domestic sovereign was articulated by Blackstone in
language which may have provided theoretical and rhetorical
reference points for later extension of the absolutist approach
into the international sphere:
• . . [o]ur king is equally sovereign and independent
within these his dominions, as any emperor is within
his empire; . . . and owes no kind of subjection to
any other potentate on earth. Hence it is, that no
suit or action can be brought against the king, even
in civil matters, because no court can have juris-
diction over him. . . . For all jurisdiction implies
superiority of power ; authority to try would be vain
and idle, without an authority to redress; and the
sentence of a court would be contemptible, unless
that court had power to command execution of it:
but who • . . shall command the king?^ 6
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The remedy available to individuals for invasion of
private rights by the crown was said by Blackstone to have
consisted of a petition in chancery, upon which the crown's
chancellor would "administer right as a matter of grace,
•27
though not upon compulsion." However, even where a claim
might otherwise be sustainable as a matter of equitable grace,
this course of remedy did not allow for a judgment of monetary
38damages
.
It is almost incongruous in view of the ideals of
subordination of governmental authority to the rights of indi-
viduals which prevailed in the United States during the post-
revolutionary period that the American courts would continue
to apply the English concept of governmental immunity which
had long been associated with monarchial despotism. The
absolutist concept was, nevertheless, absorbed into the American
jurisprudence with the rest of the common lav;, despite its
irrationality in the American context. The most plausible
explanations for this fact would seem to be that it appeared
to be an expedient policy in view of the financial instability
of the new country, ^ or, more likely still, that there was
then in practice no proven alternative to- absolute immunity
because that concept still prevailed throughout Europe at the
close of the eighteenth century. In the United States the
common law policy was applied as to municipal corporations
and governments of the federal states as well as to the national
government, and it was applied more rigidly, perhaps, than it
40had ever been applied in England. The common law rationale
was soon discarded, however, and the same results came to be
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justified on more rational but no less doubtful justifications
such as the alleged necessity to maintain efficient operation
41
of government by protecting it from interference and annoyance,
and the fear that the allowance of suits against governments
would lead to unmanageable liabilities. 2
It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth
century that legislative enactments, the Court of Claims Act
of 1855 and the Tucker Act of 1887, * enabled claimants to
maintain suits on contracts of the United States Government,
and it was only after World War II that the Federal Tort Claims
Act was enacted to authorize the prosecution of tort suits
44
against it in broad classes of cases. On the state and local
levels, decisional law inroads and piecemeal legislation have
by now made it generally possible to maintain suits against
governments on all classes of contracts and to prosecute tort
actions against governments on the basis of the Romanic
distinction between their governmental and their proprietary
functions. J The United States has now greatly ameliorated
the effects of its initial adoption of the absolutist concept
of immunity of domestic governments and has achieved domestic
policies of governmental accountability which are comparable
to, or slightly more liberal than those which were much earlier
adopted by most civil law countries.
The implementation of governmental accountability in the
domestic arena of the United Kingdom has closely paralleled
that in the United States. The Crown Suits Act, enacted in
1865, created effective judicial remedies against the crown
in actions on contract, and the maintenance of tort actions
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against the crown became authorized by virture of the Crown
47
Proceedings Act enacted in 1947. The state of the lav/ of
governmental accountability in the other countries of the
British Commonwealth is comparable to that of the United
Kingdom. 48
3. Soviet Union
No attempt is made to connect the evolution of Western
concepts of governmental accountability with the development
of current policies of the Soviet Union, for whatever historical
connections as might in fact have existed would appear to have
been obliterated by the revolution. Moreover, it is evident
that the Western conceptions of governmental subjugation to the
rule of law do not have precise counterparts within the Soviet
system, for it appears to be admitted by Soviet writers that
law is conceived of in the Soviet Union as occupying a subordi-
nate position in respect to the fluctuating ideological policies
49
of the communist state.
Nevertheless, it can be said that there appears to be
no formal concept of governmental immunity within the internal
arena of the Soviet Union, and whatever impediments as are
imposed upon the institution of suits against the state in its
domestic courts are probably procedural. The internal law
confers upon Soviet provencial courts jurisdiction over suits
brought against state organs or officials for improper admin-
51istrative acts and suits against governmental subdivisions.
Although it appears to be at least the nominal policy of the
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Soviet Government to submit to the jurisdiction of its domestic
courts in private suits, the administrative process is the
preferred channel for submission of claims against government
bureaus. State-owned corporations are, however, liberally
52
amenable to suit in the Soviet courts.
B. EXTENSION OF DOMESTIC NORMS INTO
THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
On the whole, it can be considered that the principle of
substantial, though not complete, judicial accountability is now
established as a shared legal policy of a large majority of
influential states in their domestic arenas. This can be attri-
buted to responsiveness of national decision-makers to demands
for social justice and protection of private rights. These
same social value forces have operated as a fundamental reason
for extending domestic concepts of governmental accountability
into the international arena.
1. Formulation of Absolutist Policies
The earliest cited judicial decision pertaining to
governmental immunity in the international sense is the 1812
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Schooner Exchange v.
Mc Faddon. ^ jn his classic opinion, Chief Justice Marshall
stated an assumption that international law was then understood
to require jurisdictional immunity as to the person of a
foreign sovereign, as to foreign diplomatic representatives,
and as to foreign armed forces which were allowed to pass
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through a state* s territory. He attributed to all sovereigns
a status of "perfect equality and absolute independence," and a
"common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse." From
these propositions there was implied a mutual waiver, at least
in "cases under certain peculiar circumstances," of judicial
jurisdiction over representatives and property of a foreign
sovereign which are within another state's territory with the
latter's consent.
Although the decision in the Schooner Exchange has often
been cited as authority for the application of the absolute
concept of sovereign immunity in the international sphere, it
is not clear in view of the guarded language which was used
that Marshall intended to abridge private rights in such an
inflexible manner. It can be noted that the particular case
which was before the court in that instance was one which would
have compelled the grant of immunity even under liberal modern
54
views, for the object of the suit was the recovery of a
vessel which was then in the service of the French Government
as a warship. In addition, the tenuous political, military,
and economic relationship which then existed between the
United States and France would alone have, practically compelled
a grant of immunity. But of greater significance in this
regard is the fact that restrictive policies of governmental
immunity had not yet become established in the domestic arenas
of the United States or Europe and there was therefore no other
contemporary basis of comparison but the absolutist theories.
Also significant is the fact that state trading was not then
practiced and courts of the period did not envisage the revival
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of large-scale participation of governments in commerce.
Even after erosion of absolutist views of governmental
immunity had become manifest in the domestic arenas of the
United States and England, however, and even after immunity
had come to be asserted with frequency on behalf of trading
activities and instrumentalities of foreign governments, the
Anglo-American courts continued to ignore the limitations of
the rule of the Schooner Exchange . The United Kingdom has
yet to depart from the absolute concept in its international
decisions, though the bases of British decisions appear to have
changed. The common law rationale of equality, independence,
and dignity of sovereigns appears to have been the ratio
decidendi of the initial British application of absolute immunity
56in the international sphere in 1880, but subsequent decisions
57have been couched on largely procedural grounds. The House
of Lords appeared in 1938 to waver on the brink of rejecting
58the absolute concept, but indications that the restrictive
concept would be followed in the future in the United Kingdom
have not yet materialized. The past and present members of
the British Commonwealth have deferred to the precedents of
59the United Kingdom in respect to sovereign immunity, and
they, with the United Kingdom, stand apart from other major
Western countries in retaining the absolute concept as their
nominal international rule.
After the classic decision in the Schooner Exchange
,
the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have been able to avoid
deciding international sovereign immunity conflicts until 1926.
In that year, with the State Department pressing for adoption
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of the restrictive concept and the Justice Department contending
at cross-purposes, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court
ruling and confirmed the absolute concept in Berizzi Bros. Co.
v. S.S. Pesaro. The Court expressly extended the holding of
the Schooner Exchange to merchant vessels held and used in
commerce by foreign governments and stated the opinion that the
Marshall Court would have done so if state trading had then exis-
ted in practice. In the Court's reasoning, a vessel used for
state trading served no less a public and governmental purpose
than a warship. The State Department continued to proselytize
for at least another year on behalf of restricting foreign
governments' immunities, but afterward it appears to have
adjusted its position for the time being to conform to that of
the Supreme Court. It would be a considerable time before the
State Department's position would prevail.
During this period, the years following World War I, the
Soviet Union emerged as the foremost proponent of the absolute
concept of sovereign immunity in the international arena.
Contrary to the general trend of states toward restricting
immunities in the international sphere in a manner which sub-
stantially corresponds with their domestic standards, the Soviet
Union has continued to insist upon retention of the absolute
concept in the international sphere in spite of the fact that
its domestic governmental immunity policies are nominally
liberal. The present position of the Soviet Union concerning
the immunities of foreign governments in the Soviet courts is
reflected by a recent statute which has affirmed the absolute
concept as the normal rule of decision in international cases
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and which provides for the imposition of retaliatory measures
as to states which do not reciprocate in respect to Soviet claims
for immunity.
2. Shaping of Restrictive Policies
While the common law countries were still struggling to
merely establish fundamental principles of governmental
accountability in their domestic arenas, the civil law countries
generally ran far ahead in the development of corresponding
principles in both the domestic and international arenas. In
some civil law countries, it is doubtful that the absolute
concept of immunities of foreign governments was ever followed.
Many others which initially followed it discarded it in favor
of the restrictive concept during the early and middle years
of the twentieth century.
The development of the restrictive concept in the
international sphere has been comprehensively traced in surveys
64by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Professor Joseph Sweeney. It
is indicated that the restrictive concept possibly had its
first judicial utterence in international law in Chile in
I860, and that it was clearly reflected in a decision of a
66
Belgian court in 1879. It was articulated by Italian courts
in 1886, the courts of Brazil adopted it in 1899, and it
69
was followed by the mixed courts of Egypt in 1912. In the
interval between World War I and World War II , the courts of
Greece, Austria, Switzerland, France, the Netherlands, and
70Eire adopted the restrictive concept. The courts of Rumania
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and Poland also apparently followed the restrictive concept
71during that period, but these two countries can now be
presumed to adhere to the Soviet Bloc position which is
72
contrary. An administrative court of Russia, in fact, applied
73the restrictive concept prior to the Soviet Revolution.
Post-V7orld War II decisions of the German Federal Republic
74have followed the restrictive concept.
The Latin American countries are regarded as being
75generally inclined toward the restrictive concept, and jurists
have made similar conjecture concerning Sweden, Denmark, and Nor-
76
way. Early twentieth century decisions of Luxemborg and
post-World War II decisions of Turkey and Japan are regarded as
probable indicators of tendencies on part of those countries to
77follow the restrictive concept.
The United States also adopted the restrictive concept
following World War II. The Supreme Court, it will be recalled,
had rebuffed earlier efforts of the State Department to promote
the restrictive concept in the external sphere. By the time
of World War II, however, the Court had come to conceive of
the immunity of a foreign government's activities and instru-
mentalities as primarily a foreign relations problem to be
determined by the political branch rather than by the courts,
7©
and during the war years the Court made a point of granting,
79
and denying, immunity in accordance with the State Department's
suggestions.
With the federal judiciary having thus retired itself
to a subordinate position in respect to sovereign immunity
determinations, the State Department asserted its new preroga-
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tives and announced in 1952 that it would thenceforth follow
the restrictive concept in its suggestions to courts in
individual cases. w The Supreme Court, by uniformly denying
certiorari in subsequent cases where the State Department's
suggestions were followed, has indicated satisfaction with
that arrangement. As of this time, however, it is not perfectly
clear how faithfully the State Department itself has been
willing to follow the restrictive concept, for there is late
indication that political expediencies occasionally still
prevail over strict observance of restrictive policies and
81
the requirements of justice in particular cases.
Where the federal judiciary has been left to its own
devices by the absence of a specific suggestion by the State
Department in a case, it has displayed a tendency in recent
years to restrict immunities of foreign governments even
further than they have been restricted elsewhere. Thus in 1955,
R2in the National City Bank of New York v, Republic of China,
the Supreme Court denied immunity to China in respect to the
bank's counterclaims for some $1,600,000 for defaulted Republic
of China treasury notes' after the foreign government had first
invoked the jurisdiction of American courts to recover $200,000
which it had on deposit in an account at. the bank. The Court
stressed the intrinsic unfairness which would result from
disallowing the counterclaims, since under ordinary legal
principles they might defeat the claim which the governmental
party had brought before the courts in the first place. Noting
that the climate of opinion had ceased to favor governmental
immunity from suit, the majority of the Court seemed unimpressed
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under the circumstances by the dissenting argument that under
formal restrictive theories matters pertaining to a state's
public debt have traditionally been considered to compel the
grant of immunity.
More recently, in 1964, a U.S. Court of Appeals, in
Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria General, abandoned the
Romanic distinctions which had theretofore typified the
decisional law approach to restricting the judicial immunities
of foreign governments, and it propounded a more stringent
new test. What the court devised was, in effect, a presumption
against immunity, which is rebuttable by showing that the
governmental defendant's activity giving rise to the claim is
of one of the following kinds of political acts: internal
administrative acts; legislative acts; acts concerning armed
forces; acts concerning diplomatic activity; and public loans.
The court, emphasizing the interests of individuals doing
business with governments, explained, "We do not think that
the restrictive theory • . . requires sacrificing the interests
of private litigants to international comity in other than
these limited categories."
3. Effects of Growth of State Trading
While the force of demands for social justice and
protection of private rights has provided the fundamental
requirement for extension of domestic policies of governmental
accountability into the international arena, the modern revival
of state trading has provided the occasion for it and has been
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the principal object of concern. The emergence of Soviet-style
state trading has given particular impetus to the trend toward
restricting the immunities of foreign governments.
Although governments had participated extensively in
international commerce long before the nineteenth century,
there appears to be no evidence that the judicial immunities
of governments had formally been challenged before then in
regard either to state trading or to other state activities.
State trading has been traced at least as far back in history
as the middle ages, but in the intervening centuries it fell
84
out of practice. During those centuries, it has been seen,
absolutist concepts of governmental immunity flourished.
In the nineteenth century state trading had reached a
low ebb, laissez-faire policies prevailed, and governments
85
exercised few economic functions. All national governments
performed substantially similar functions, and these common
functions did not include state trading, Having a community
of functions, governments had a shared interest in protecting
all their functions from the risk of foreign interference.
The initial instances of limited state trading which appeared
during the latter part of the nineteenth century were possibly
considered by most countries to have been mere aberrations
which did not warrant special juridical concern.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the
effects of the industrial revolution and the continual expansion
of international commerce had brought about new imperialistic
rivalries and a general trend toward protectionist trade
policies and reliance upon governmental involvement in commercial
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and economic affairs, 86 and state trading became more common-
place. Concurrently with these developments, Belgian courts
had restricted the immunity of a foreign government with
87
respect to its trade monopoly, and other courts had begun to
articulate national variations of a restrictive immunity policy
based upon Romanic tests.
In the early years of the twentieth century, theorists
gave increasing attention to state trading as a possible
panacea for the social and economic ills which had followed
in the wake of the still advancing industrial revolution. 88
The Soviet Revolution and World War I accelerated the growth
of state trading. Military exigencies required the United
States and European countries to resort to state trading, and
state trading was an intrinsic part of the theories of revolu-
OQ
tionary socialists in Russia. The Western countries virtually
retired from state trading after the end of the war, but state
trading nevertheless became ensconced as a permanently important
part of world trade as an aftermath of the Soviet Revolution.
It was connected in Soviet planning with state production,
and it was deemed to be necessary for the establishment of a
strong communist state and for the severence of its economic
90dependence on the West.
Although only very few European countries had applied
the restrictive concept in the international sphere prior to
that time, the number so multiplied after World War I that
by the beginning of World War II only the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and Germany could be counted as major European
countries which continued to apply the absolute concept as an
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91international rule. Moreover, even Germany had made inroads by
joining with ten other Continental countries and two Latin
American countries in the Brussels Convention of 1926 which
had the general effect of extending the restrictive concept to
92government-owned commercial vessels and cargoes.
Even though the United Kingdom declined to adopt the
restrictive concept, the avoidance of sovereign immunity claims
in connection with Soviet state trading activities was a matter
of concern to it. The Soviet Union had established trade
delegations abroad as its normal instrumentalities for state
trading, but the United Kingdom declined to receive such a
delegation without having first obtained a very substantial
93
waiver of immunity.
In the United States, the State Department began at the
end of World War I to argue for the adoption of the restrictive
concept, though it is not clear that its position initially
had particular reference to the emergence of Soviet state
trading rather than to the general involvement of nations
in state trading activities during the war and post-war periods.
Congress expressed sentiments of sort against state trading
by enacting the Public Vessels Act of 1925 which had the
effect of acknowledging responsibility on part of the U.S.
Government for damages arising from operation of commercial
95
vessels owned or operated by it.
Even after the 'end of the long period of non-recognition
of the Soviet Union the State Department remained adamant
against receiving a Soviet Trade Delegation for fear of giving
state trading an important entree into the American market
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and for fear that pleas of immunity could result in exploitation
96
of American merchants. In addition, there was apprehension
concerning Soviet insistence upon diplomatic immunities for
commercial agents who would comprise the staff of a trade
97delegation. Instead, the Soviet Union was required to conduct
its business within the United States through a corporation,
AMTORG, which had been established in 1924, during the period
of non-recognition. The AMTORG Corporation, though wholly
owned and controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the
Soviet Union, was incorporated under the laws of New York as
the sales and purchasing agent for the Soviet foreign trade
monopoly in the United States. As a domestic corporation of
the United States, AMTORG was not only fully amenable to civil
suit in the United States, but it was subject also to state
98
and federal regulation.
During World War II, the United States and its allies
were again required to resort to extensive state trading.
Hoping for a return to pre-war patterns of trade relations
after the conclusion of hostilities, the United States main-
tained a policy of minimizing state trading as much as possible
during the war. After the war it encouraged others to revert
quickly to former private trading practices. American policy
contemplated among other things that the Soviet Union again
be relegated to conducting its trade in the United States
99
through the AMTORG Corporation.
The whole picture had changed, however. Prior to
World War II the Soviet Union had maintained a somewhat
indifferent attitude in regard to foreign trade, for it was
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then considered to be in the Soviet national interest to
minimize foreign trade relationships in order to reduce depend-
ence upon capitalist economic systems. its acquisition of
satellite states in Eastern Europe and alliances in Eastern
Asia gave the Soviet Union vast additional bases of power,
and the East and West became embroiled in intense political,
economic, and ideological cold war. By the early 1950' s the
Soviet Union, together with its satellites, had acquired the
political motivation as well as the economic ability to actively
expand trade with less strongly aligned Western countries
and to aggressively seek commercial ties with less developed
countries. In this context the United States imposed
sweeping legislative and administrative restrictions upon
American trade with communist states.
It was also in this situational context that the State
Department in 1952 announced in "The Tate Letter" that it
would thereafter follow the restrictive concept of sovereign
immunity in its suggestions to the courts concerning suits
against foreign governments. After reviewing the trend of
Western countries toward adoption of the restrictive concept,
the State Department's Acting Legal Adviser said in his letter
to the Attorney General
:
It is thus evident that with the possible excep-
tion of the United Kingdom little support has been
found except on the part of the Soviet Union and
its satellites for continued full acceptance of
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity.
. . .
The reasons which obviously motivate state trading
countries in adhering to the theory with perhaps
increasing rigidity are most persuasive that the
United States should change its policy. . . .[T^he
widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities
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makes necessary a practice which will enable persons
doing business with them to have their rights deter-
mined in the courts. 102
An important inference which can be derived from these
events is that the growth of state trading has had the effect
of activating widespread extension of principles of governmental
accountability into the international arena. It can be further
reasoned without detracting from the validity of the democratic
ideals of state responsibility which have been centrally involved
in the matter, that the relative national political and economic
interests of private trading countries vis-a-vis the interests
of state traders will continue to operate long into the future
to influence the trends of international immunity policies.
It does not follow, however, that restrictive inter-
national immunity policies can be identified only with the
interests of state trading countries. To the contrary, it will
be shown in the following chapters that the state traders can
embrace such policies without significant prejudice to their
national political and economic interests and that they stand




APPRAISAL OF THE COMPETING
JURIDICAL POLICIES
A. INSUPPORTABILITY OF THE ABSOLUTE CONCEPT
The absolute concept of sovereign immunity lacks essential
validity as an international legal policy. It has been seen
that it came into limited operation in the international sphere
as an outgrowth of domestic law concepts which have since been
repudiated by the overwhelming majority of states. It cannot be
said that it was ever fully adopted as an international policy
by the world community as a whole, and it appears to have been
the predominant rule for only a few decades. There is therefore
no credible basis for claiming that the absolute concept was
ever established as customary international law. Nor can it be
validated on other rational grounds.
1. Community Interests Perspective
Proponents of the absolute concept can no longer point to
any widely inclusive interests of states which can be served by
adherence to the concept as they could in former times. As
late as the latter nineteenth century the demand that govern-




risk of intervention by foreign courts was consistent with the
shared interests of the effective consensus of states. This
was usually true irrespective of whether one state might
otherwise have had a justiciable interest concerning a private
claim brought against another state, for all governments per-
formed approximately the same functions and each had a substan-
tially equal interest in protecting the efficiency of states*
common activities on a mutual and reciprocal basis.
It has been seen that the policy of indiscriminately
protecting all government activities has lost support in the
international arena with the advance of state trading. This
has occurred not merely because state trading was long considered
unrespectable from Western viewpoint or because it could not
widely be perceived to be a legitimate government function
—
it has already been indicated that most Western countries have
sometimes resorted to it. It has occurred for the more cogent
reason that there has ceased to be an effective equivalence of
state interests which might be served through the blanket
grant of immunity to all governmental activities. In other
words: "There appears to be no particular community interest
in conferring advantage upon the state trading system by
permitting ... an immunity from legal process to which the
instrumentalities of the competing system are not entitled."
While all governments no longer perform uniformly common
functions and states therefore lack uniformly mutual interests
in protecting foreign governments* activities, they do have a
shared interest in the promotion of policies which operate to
protect their inclusively held legal norms and social values.
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2. Social Values Perspective
There has occurred since the industrial revolution a
general trend toward "fundamental democratization of society"
which reflects community response to intensified social demands
for human security and the greater production and sharing of
all human values ;1°4 greater respect for the dignity of individ-
uals, more conscientious concern for individuals' general
well-being, more careful regard for the economic security of
individuals, and the improvement of standards of public rectitude
for protecting private legal rights are examples of the demands.
Clear evidence of this trend has been the general growth of
state accountability which was described in the preceeding
chapter.
The principle of judicially enforced responsibility of
governments is demonstrably established in a substantial measure
in domestic arenas of most of the world community and can thus
be considered to reflect a widely inclusive juridical norm of
state accountability. Similarly, the underlying social demands
can be understood to reflect the prevalent social value expec-
tations of the world community.
Although humanitarian motives are involved in the matter,
neither the principle nor the underlying values are limited in
operation to protecting erstwhile helpless individuals harmed
by tortious or irresponsible acts of a state or its agents.
It has been seen that the principle of governmental accountabil-
ity has operated also in favor of commercial concerns which
transact business with governments, and it is in this area that
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the opportunity for sovereign immunity conflicts in the inter-
national sphere is the greatest. It can be observed that legal
standards comprising the essence of fair dealing and justice in
relation to private rights in commercial matters are also
considered binding upon most states in their domestic arenas,
and this too can be considered to be a widely inclusive
juridical norm.
The blanket denial to private parties of access to
reasonably convenient forums for the enforcement of claims
against foreign governmental wrong-doers obviates private legal
rights in a manner which is inconsistent with the prevalent
social values and the inclusive juridical norms of state account-
ability of the world community.
3. Foreign Relations Perspective
The most frequent and most rational justification urged
for the grant of immunity to foreign governmental defendants
in private suits is that foreign relations could not properly
be conducted by the executive branch if judicial jurisdiction
105
were asserted. The argument appears to have found legalistic
expression both historically and in modern times in the theory
that the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by one state over the
activities, representatives, or property of another state is
derogatory to the latter 1 s sovereign power, dignity, or independ-
ence.
It is relevant here to observe that the rational validity
of the underlying political concept of state sovereignty has
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itself been cogently challenged, if not fully discredited, during
this century. os It is not sufficient, however, to rest the
case against sovereign immunity merely upon the denial of
sovereign substance of governmental acts, for there appears to
be continued widespread acceptance of the concept of sovereignty,
at least as a convenient juridical tool. Assuming, then, the
validity of the sovereignty concept, the rational validity of
a claim for judicial immunity based upon it is nevertheless
limited.
For one thing, it is difficult to perceive how a state's
legitimate interests are violated by enforcing against it in the
external arena the obligations which it, in common with other
states, has admitted to be enforceable in principle against it
in its own courts. It is all the more so where the forum
state's assertion of jurisdiction is supported by a substantial
connection with the controversey and a reasonable standing to
adjudicate it, and where the forum makes a logical choice of
law to govern its decision, and where it does in fact apply
appropriate law justly, evenly, and with due regard for the
integrity of the defendant state's legislative and administrative
processes. Under these circumstances it would be the forum
state's legitimate interests which would be derogated if its
1 07
exercise of jurisdiction were disallowed.
Even states purporting to follow the absolute concept in
the international sphere have recognized certain instances where
the forum state has a justiciable interest in the controversey
which is sufficient to override countervailing claims for
immunity. Accordingly, it has been widely accepted in such
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states that the forum* s paramount concern for the determination
of interests in real property situated within its territory
and in the determination of interests in estates administered
by it v/arrants its exercise of jurisdiction over foreign
governmental parties. -1- 08 By comparison, it does not appear
that a state* s interest in the redress of alleged wrongs
committed against its nationals by foreign governments, or its
interest in redressing torts committed within its territory
or contracts executed or to be performed there, is of a
materially inferior order than its concern for the orderly
administration of real property and estates. 109
The credibility of claims that a defendant state *s
important interests are violated by the exercise of foreign
judicial jurisdiction in civil suits is minimized when one
considers the nature of the relief which is characteristically
sought in bringing suits against foreign governments. In the
typical instance the private claimant seeks merely the recovery
of monetary damages which are ascertainable through ordinary
private law rules, and most often the only extraordinary factor
in the case is the fact that the defendant is a foreign
government. The claimant does not seek a form of relief which
would entail a superiority of authority or the application of
force on part of the forum state to enforce. He does not seek,
for example, to cause the forum to modify or annul a legislative
or administrative enactment of the defendant government, nor
does he typically seek equitable relief such as specific
performance or mandatory or prohibitive injunction against
officials of the foreign state. 10
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B. PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE
RESTRICTIVE CONCEPT
The essential insupportability of the absolute concept
of sovereign immunity has caused many states to limit the
instances in which foreign governments might be considered
immune from their civil judicial jurisdiction. The result has
been the development of an international jurisprudence which
in principle is an improvement over the absolute concept but
which is still fraught with doctrinal and practical imperfections.
The most fundamental of these is the objection that the restric-
tive concept does not yet satisfy the best democratic ideals
of justice.
m
1. Limitations from a Democratic Perspective
It can be observed that the decisional law process of
restricting immunities in the international sphere has uniformly
begun on the assumption that there is a requirement for immunity
to be granted in respect to many governmental functions, and
it has then proceeded to deny immunity only in respect to the
kinds of governmental activities as to which it would be most
unconscionable to grant it. Instances where immunity has been
denied have generally involved foreign government activities of
a commercial character. The process has tended to confirm
immunity as to most other state activities, i.e., those which
are patently non-commercial. The restrictive immunity concept




enough in denying immunity. -^
On the face of the matter, it seems questionable whether
it can ever be a legitimate interest of a government in a
democratic society to shield any of its activities from
enforced accountability at the expense of the right of private
individuals and commercial concerns to obtain redress for harm
sustained as result of governmental operations. On the
other hand, it can be persuasively shown that this standard
of idealism is not practically attainable on a comprehensive
international scale.
It is recalled in this connection that there is an
observable trend toward greater democracy in the world
community, and it can be considered that a number of states
already have achieved a high degree of democracy in their
national institutions. Some strongly democratic Western
countries, moreover, appear to be advancing toward the complete
abrogation of governmental immunities within their domestic
arenas; the outstanding example of this is France, for nowhere
else has the complete abrogation of judicial immunities of a
government in its domestic courts been more closely approxi-
mated. Yet, as far as can be ascertained, none of these
countries—not even France—has asserted that there should
be a general abandonment of civil jurisdictional immunities
in international practice.
This can be explained partly by the fact that states
can perceive that they have a community interest in protecting
their common functions from interference by foreign authorities
through the grant of immunity to other governments upon the
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basis of expectations of mutuality and reciprocity. As shown
above, the factor of reciprocity does appear to operate
effectively in the matter except where an uncommon state
115function, e.g., state trading, is involved. If it can thus
be understood in terms of granting immunity only in regard to
states' common functions and excluding from immunity the
functions which are not uniformly performed by all states,
then the restrictive concept can easily be reconciled with the
community interest.
It is submitted, moreover, that the restrictive concept
has additional justification as an international legal policy
because it accords with the prevalent juridical norms and
social value expectations in the domestic arenas of states even
though it does not fully satisfy the highest ideals of some
states. The fact is that the strong standard of accountability
which is applied to the French State in its domestic arena, or
even the somewhat milder standard which operates internally
in the United States, does not prevail in most other states.
To the contrary, the prevalent test of state accountability
in the domestic sphere appears to be the Romanic distinction
between the political and "fiscal" functions of governments
which is employed with national variations in most of the
116
civil law countries.
A large number of countries can therefore view the
restrictive concept of sovereign immunity as merely the logical
extension of their domestic law norms into the international
sphere. As to other states, the restrictive concept can be
viewed in light of political realities as a compromise which
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serves fairly to balance the community interest in minimizing
foreign restraints upon states • free exercise of functions in
the international arena and the community interest in providing
forums to private claimants for the redress of violations of
legal rights.
Considering furthermore that continuing difficulty
is being experienced in efforts to achieve effective consensus
in regard to a community policy which merely limits the
immunities of states, there would appear to be practically
no hope of achieving broad support for a substantially more
drastic policy within the foreseeable future. The restrictive
concept is at least palatable from a democratic perspective
because it does operate to deny immunity in the majority of
instances in which claims are likely to arise, and it would
appear to be amply justified from that perspective because it
is the most liberal standard prospectively attainable on a
comprehensive scale.
2. Doctrinal Deficiencies
The approach of the civil law courts which began to
develop restrictive international immunity policies around
the turn of the century was to construct a formalistic
framework in which to distinguish the immune and non-immune
activities of states. For a theoretical foundation they
drew upon their idiomatic expressions of Romanic law concepts
which they had adopted to rationalize the principle of
117limited state accountability in the domestic sphere.
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The civilians reasoned that:
. . .
the immunity, as it had developed in the 19th
Century, was intended to apply only with respect to
acts involving the sovereignty of a foreign state.
They described these acts as public acts, or political
acts, or acts done jure imperii . They reasoned that
the immunity was never intended to extend to . . .
other acts, various] y described as private acts, acts
of a civil nature, or acts done jure gestionis . . . .118
There is a thread of common policy running through
the civilian decisions. The courts applying the Romanic tests
have rather consistently classified governments patently
commercial transactions as of the jure gestionis category
and in respect to these transactions have relegated the
governmental parties to the ordinary legal processes. The
clearly commercial acts of governments are thereby removed
from the mystique of sovereignty and are required to meet the
demands of justice and fair dealing on a par with the trans-
actions of private traders.
The common thread ends there, however, for it seems
impossible to glean from the international decisions any
clear or comprehensible standard which can be of much help to
courts in borderline cases, i.e., those involving states
•
activities which are neither clearly public, political, or
jure imperii on one hand, nor clearly private, civil, or jure
gestionis on the other.
While governments • transactions in the conduct of
commercial businesses appear to be regarded with fair regularity
to be of the jure gestionis category, what about a government's
financial dealings connected with the business of the state's
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treasury, for example? In a manner reminescent of Romanic
120distinctions between the state and the fiscus , a Swiss
court "unhesitatingly" affirmed its jurisdiction in an action
brought against the Austrian Treasury by the Swiss holder of
Austrian treasury bonds which were purchased in Switzerland
121
and were repayable in Swiss currency. A contrasting view-
point seems to be implicit in a later French decision in which
jurisdiction was denied over the "sovereign" act of the Bank
of Spain where the bank refused to give new currency in
exchange for old, no longer valid currency which has been
122
remitted to it by the claimant.
Moreover, the fact that a state* s transaction is commer-
cial in form gives no assurance under the decisions that
immunity will be granted if its ultimate purpose is sovereign.
For example, a contract of the Government of Rumania for the
purchase of leather for its army has been held in Italy to be
an act of a private law nature not entitling Rumania to
immunity, but a contract of the State of Vietnam for the
purchase of cigarettes for its army was held by a French court
to justify immunity because it was a state function performed
124for the public service.
A practical difficulty with the restrictive concept
is, then, that it is presently ill-defined. This has certainly
resulted in part from the tendencies of national decision-
makers to frame their international decisions in terms of their
domestic precedents and in part from the fact that this important
and complicated international juridical policy has been
conceived and developed principally in terms of formalistic
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and highly abstract theories. So great has been the resultant
uncertainty and confusion in the application of the restrictive
concept, and so frequently have there been eccentric decisions
by courts in attempting to apply these hardly ascertainable
standards, that courts and commentators alike have sometimes




The uncertainty and confusion which have characterized
efforts to formulate restrictive policies of sovereign immunity
through the decisional law process have been aggravated by a
general divergence of national practices for implementation
of the restrictive concept. While it is beyond the scope of
inquiry here to examine in detail the various judicial modes
which are connected with the operation of restrictive policies,
an appraisal of the general efficacy of restrictive policies
requires brief mention of local practices which operate
frequently to modify or obviate the substantive rights of
claimants to proceed against foreign governmental defendants.
Policies of permitting the exercise of civil jurisdiction over
foreign governments in broad classes of cases have opened
the door to concomitant questions which are somewhat procedural
in character and which are therefore especially susceptible to
nationalistic variations of treatment.
It has been observed, for example, that modes of asserting
and acquiring jurisdiction over foreign governmental defendants
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vary considerably among states which have adopted the restrictive
concept. There are no clear or uniform rules for defining
the categories of representatives of governmental defendants
which may permissibly be served with judicial process under
general principles of international law or upon which process
may be served within the forum's territory to establish in
personam jurisdiction under the forum's rules. Moreover, the
validity of extraterritorial service of process upon officials
of foreign governmental defendants within the defendants
'
territory in accordance with the forum's rules has sometimes
been upheld by national courts but remains debatable on a
general scale. Also, while the attachment of a foreign
government's property within the forum's territory appears to
be uniformly approved in principle among restrictive concept
states as a means of aquisition of in rem or quasi in rem
jurisdiction, the limits of the kinds and character of the
property which may be attached remains problematical. The
judicial enforceability of a judgment against a foreign
government is even more doubtful, and it is probably impossible
in most instances. A few states have permitted execution
against commercial property of foreign governments, but most
states which have otherwise purported to follow the restrictive
concept, including the United States, have flatly denied
execution against all property of foreign governments.
Policies of many restrictive concept states are indefinite in
129this regard.
Divergencies of modes by which states determine or
recognize the validity of sovereign immunity claims in particular
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cases have been a source of further uncertainties and resent-
ments. It has been a frequent practice of states to rely upon
executive officials to effectively decide the factual and legal
issues concerning the grant or denial of immunity in individual
cases, but it has sometimes seemed questionable to impartial
observers whether or not the executive branch of a government
is capable of deciding these juridical issues without giving
undue weight to national political objectives or to foreign
relations expediencies.
c » POLICIES FOR REGULARIZING
STATES' IMMUNITIES
1. Need for Regularization
There have been seen to be most compelling reasons why
the absolute concept of sovereign immunity should be universally
abandoned in the international sphere in favor of policies
which fairly balance the prevalent social value expectations
of the world community and the inclusive political and economic
interests of states. The restrictive concept of sovereign
immunity, as it has been developed through the unilateral
decisional law efforts of states, does essentially satisfy
those requirements—but more than that is needed. The general
effectiveness and acceptability of restrictive policies as
an international juridical standard have been seriously impeded
by ambiguities and uncertainties in formal doctrinal expressions
and by divergencies in national implementation.
In an era of continual intensification of economic,
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social, and political interdependence of the world community,
this state of affairs hardly satisfies the minimal requirements
of international legal order. To the contrary, the least
requirements of orderly international intercourse would seem
to require the establishment of comprehensible and predictible
national sovereign immunity policies to guide private parties
and governmental parties of divers nationalities in the
development and discharge of their mutual legal relationships.
In addition, intergovernmental friction and resentments which
have been attributed to sovereign immunity conflicts in the
past could be reduced in the future if decision-makers were
able to refer to a body of stable, ascertainable, and consistent
policies to govern both their assertions of immunity abroad
and their determinations of immunity claims asserted in their
own forums by other states.
This point of view seems to be implicit in the recent
reasoning of a U.S. Court of Appeals in Victory Transport, Inc.
131
v. Comisaria General. Dealing in that case with a claim for
damages to a vessel chartered by an agency of the Spanish
Government to transport wheat for distribution in Spain, the
court demonstrated impatience with the Romanic theories which
have dominated the decisional law approach to restricting
immunities. Instead of attempting to use the traditional tests,
the court looked to the functional objective of restrictive
immunity policies which it conceived to be the balancing of
the "interests of individuals doing business with foreign
governments in having their legal rights determined by courts
and the interest of foreign governments in being free to perform
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certain political acts without undergoing the embarrassment
or hindrance of defending the propriety of such acts before
foreign courts." As if intending to restate the entire
restrictive concept in that functional context, the court
offered the empirical test of restricting immunities to
certain ennumerated categories of acts "about which sovereigns
132have traditionally been quite sensitive."
What is needed, then, is a means to regularize inter-
national sovereign immunity policies on a comprehensive
global scale in a manner well suited for reducing highly
ambiguous doctrinal pronouncements to workable and definitive
rules and for eliminating important irregularities in national
practice. The most likely mode for accomplishing this, it
will be seen, would be codification of restrictive immunity
principles through multilateral treaties.
Cogent reasons for continuing efforts to develop and
refine the restrictive concept of sovereign immunity were
indicated in the preceding two sections of this chapter.
Additional strong reasons for doing so are disclosed by
considering the possible alternatives.
2. Alternative Modes for Regularization
It is unnecessary to repeat here the arguments which
persuasively dispose of claims to the validity of the absolute
concept of sovereign immunity. Similarly, it has been amply
shown that the other extreme alternative, the general abrogation
of state immunities, can be written off for the foreseeable
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future as a political impossibility regardless of its idealistic
merits. There are, however, other compromise approaches to
the sovereign immunity problem which have been suggested by
jurists as alternatives to the restrictive concept.
One such suggestion is that the liabilities which a
state has assumed in its domestic arena as an expression of
its own concept of governmental accountability be extended
to claimants in other states on a reciprocal basis through
treaties. In support of reciprocity as a basis for determining
immunity claims, reference can be made to the fact that most
states are today substantially accountable in their domestic
courts. It is arguable, furthermore, that the rule would be
a convenient one because the domestic liabilities of states
are of known or ascertainable content and that it would be
politically acceptable to most states because no new or
additional liabilities are imposed upon them in the inter-
i 33
national sphere.
Specific statutory support for the reciprocity approach
in the United States is found in an enactment which provides
that "citizens or subjects of any government which accords
to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims
against such government in its courts have the privilege of
prosecuting claims against the United States in the Court of
134Claims
. . .
." Also, reciprocity is indicated as a possible
alternative to absolute immunity in the courts of the Soviet
Union by a statutory provision which authorizes the Council
of Ministers to prescribe retaliatory measures against states
which are sued in the Soviet courts but which do not grant
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immunity in their own forums in suits against the Soviet
135Union. Other examples of reciprocity exist in practice
but need not be detailed here. l^
6
An important argument which has been made against
the reciprocity approach is that the policy of the defendant
state in granting immunity to other states is not relevant
to the merits of a claim made against it and would not justify
the denial of a remedy to the individual claimant. In
Lauterpacht *s words:
The misgivings and the criticism to which the
grant of jurisdictional immunity to foreign states
occasionally gives rise are due not so much to the
absence of reciprocity as to the fact that it is
possible for a foreign state or its agency to dis-
regard or invade with impunity rights otherwise
protected by the law of the land. The adoption
of the principle of reciprocity would accentuate
—
it would not remove—what is increasingly considered
to be an undesirable situation. 137
An alternative suggested by Lauterpacht is to assimilate
by treaty the immunity of the defendant state to that of the
forum state under the forum's domestic law. This, it is argued,
would subjugate the defendant state to the forum's domestic
1 38
expectations of governmental accountability, and, since
the forum would apply a familiar body of law—its own, the
assimilative approach would enhance predictability and
uniformity of results within a given state.
A practical objection to the assimilative approach,
and one which would appear to be decisive in a realistic
political context, is that it would virtually deprive a state
of all means of direction over its external liabilities and
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would possibly put some states in apprehension of uncontrollable
foreign interference with their external activities. For
example, reasons which will appear clearly below make it
inconceivable that the Soviet Union could be persuaded to
submit to such a rule in the foreseeable future, although
it does appear to be within the realm of possibility to expect
that the Soviets will eventually agree to a compromise policy
based upon restrictive principles . ^ Furthermore, without
suggesting that such objections have much validity or would
even be decisive in many instances, it is predictable that
some states would hesitate to accept the assimilative approach
for the mere reason that it would have the politically undesir-
able result in some instances of giving foreign claimants a
greater right to proceed against the state than that enjoyed
by the defendant state's own domestic claimants. There would
be, for example, a significant gap between the accountability
of the United States under its own iaws and the level of
accountability which might be imposed upon it if sued in France
under the latter* s more liberal standards of state respons-
ibility.
Both the assimilative and the reciprocity approaches
are subject to the additional broad objection that neither of
them lends itself in a large degree to unifying international
immunity policies or to eliminating national divergencies
from international practice. Under either concept, the rule
of decision would be determined solely by reference to the law
of a single state. While this might be conducive to greater
uniformity and predictability within individual states, the
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need for uniformity on a comprehensive global scale would not
be significantly served.
Instead of employing treaty mechanisms in a manner
which might tend to perpetuate the division of international
immunity policies, it seems more desirable to utilize them to
consolidate, define, and make more effective the advances
which have already been made through the decisional law process.
One such approach would be the creation of a supra-
national judicial institution having competence to adjudicate
private claims made against states. One commentator has
alluded to numerous proposals which have been made for estab-
lishing private international claims courts or arbitration
panels for that purpose. An obvious difficulty with such
a proposal, however, is the reluctance often shown by states
to commit themselves to submitting their disputes to the
jurisdiction of forums other than their own. Not only have
states frequently been reluctant to consent to the exercise of
jurisdiction over them by courts of other states, a fact which
is manifest in the nature of the problems considered in this
study, but there also has been considerable unwillingness on
part of states to submit unreservedly to the competence of
supranational tribunals. The lack of compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice and the self-judging
reservations of some states regarding the Court's jurisdiction
are well known examples of this tendency. 41 Without compulsory
jurisdiction over states, the possible benefits to be derived




An additional problem is posed by the lack of a definite
or uniform international legal standard for defining and
measuring the liabilities of states in respect to private
claimants. It has been commented in this connection, "The
creation of a court is not equivalent to creating a juris-
prudence." "Contrariwise," it is continued, "given a body
of ascertainable lav;, the selection of a forum for its enforce-
ment is not difficult." 42 Accordingly, the regularization
of international legal standards of governmental accountability
appears to be the first requirement, and if that is accomplished,
then the need for an international claims forum is obviated.
The remaining approach—one which appears to be
desirable in all events—is the regularization of the law of
sovereign immunity by multilateral codification of restrictive
international immunity policies. It is submitted that the only
likely alternative to the comprehensive codification of
restrictive policies appears to be the indefinite prolongation
of the present state of disorganization in this important





A. POTENTIAL USEFULNESS OF CODIFICATION
It has been suggested above that courts have thus far
failed to achieve certainty or uniformity through their
decisional law efforts to formulate restrictive immunity
policies partly because of their tendencies to apply their
divergent municipal law policies in international cases and
to couch their policy decisions in difficult abstractions.
In addition, it would seem also to result in part from
limitations upon the competence of national decision-makers
to unilaterally render policy pronouncements which are com-
prehensively authoritative.
There are numerous reasons why the general treaty
approach is better suited for achieving what the decisional
law approach has failed to do. In the multilateral treaty-
making process states act not unilaterally but in concert.
The power of the concerted will of a majority of states and
the negotiating power of minorities are probably at their
greatest, and expectations of mutuality and reciprocity work




states. Exchanges of ideas during preparatory work and plenary
sessions disclose virtually all relevant points of view.
Reasons are expounded, and national interests, both legitimate
and illegitimate, are exposed and subjected to scrutiny and
judgment. Pressures are put upon dissenting states to conform
to the majority will and, in turn, upon the majority to com-
promise its view to accommodate important minority viewpoints
.
The resultant treaty can usually be assumed to reflect the
prevalent values and the inclusive interests of the states
represented.
The objective of limiting the jurisdictional immunities
of states in the international sphere is clearly a meritorious
one from a democratic perspective, but the questions remain:
how greatly can states realistically expect to restrict
immunities on a broad international scale? how far do states
actually want to commit themselves to submitting to the judicial
control of other states? with what degree of precision should
restrictive policies be stated? It can be observed that in
innumerable instances where a high degree of particularization
has been required concerning legal problems common to a large
group of states, resort to the multilateral treaty approach
has been required to achieve it. That appears to be the case
here.
World legal order would be significantly advanced by
the agreement of a large number of states in respect to a set
of uniform and manageable rules which could be perceived to
reflect the community values and interests. Universality or
near-universality of assent would not be required, nor could
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it realistically be expected to be achieved in the very near
future. The effective establishment of a treaty codification,
perhaps one patterned on the Brussels Convention which will be
considered below, would serve not only to advance the interests
of signatory states in their mutual relations. it might
serve also as an authoritative expression of international
public policy by which even the accountability of non-signatory
states could be measured.
B. APPRAISAL OF PAST CODIFICATION EFFORTS
The frequency with which sovereign immunity claims have
arisen and the pervasive economic, political, and social
implications connected with such claims have from time to time
during the past half-century aroused interest among inter-
national lawyers for regularizing the law of sovereign immunity
by treaty codification, only a very few multilateral treaties
have been produced as a result of this concern, however, and
the few treaties which have involved sovereign immunity have
focused merely upon the maritime aspects of the problem. The
only consummated efforts to regularize sovereign immunity
policies in other areas of commerce have been by bilateral
agreements
.
1. * Brussels Convention
The most consequential codification effort to date
has been the Brussels Convention of 1926, l43 which has been
adopted by a small number of maritime states. The tenor of
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that treaty was to define the jurisdictional immunities of
state-ovmed vessels along the same restrictive lines as had
been attempted by some states through the decisional law process,
but the precise and definitive terminology which was employed
constituted a significant improvement over the traditional
tests which had been used by the courts.
Article 1 of the Convention provides as a basic rule
that vessels owned or operated by states and state-owned
cargoes are to be assimilated to private vessels and cargoes
with respect to liabilities connected with operation of the
vessels and carriage of the cargoes. The second and fourth
articles affirm that the liabilities of such vessels and cargoes
will be adjudicated by the same courts and in accordance with
the same laws and procedures as those available in cases of
private merchant vessels and cargoes.
The first section of article 3 of the Convention
specifies in the following terms the functional types of
state-owned vessels which are not assimilated to private
vessels for jurisdictional purposes and the remedies which
are available in cases of such vessels:
The provisions of the two preceding Articles
shall not be applicable to ships of war, Government
yachts, patrol vessels, hospital ships, auxiliary
vessels, supply ships, and other craft owned or
operated by a State, and used at the time a cause
of action arises exclusively on Governmental and
non-commercial service, and such vessels shall not
be subject to seizure, attachment or detention by
any legal process, nor to judicial proceedings in
rem .
Nevertheless, claimants shall have the right
of taking proceedings in the competent tribunals
of the State owning or operating the vessels, without
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that State being permitted to avail itself of its
immunity in . . . [specified classes of admiralty
claims],
Analagous rules are provided in regard to state-owned cargoes
carried on immune government vessels, and for state-owned
cargoes carried on private merchant vessels "for Governmental
145
and non-commercial purposes."
The Brussels Convention has been adhered to at different
times by a total of only eighteen states, and this number
includes neither the United States, the United Kingdom, nor
the Soviet Union. Apparently no more than fourteen states
now adhere to it, for four original adherents were subsequently
absorbed into the Soviet Bloc and can be assumed to have
denounced the treaty. The reason assigned by the United
States for its decision to not participate in the Convention
was that it had already enacted the Public Vessels Act of
1925, 48 and it had thereby "already given effect to the wish
1 49for uniformity in the laws relating to State-owned ships."
In reality the statute did provide effectively for balancing
the interests of the United States and those of a foreign
claimant in event of litigation involving a public vessel or
cargo of the United States abroad, but it did not actually
admit the applicability of the restrictive concept in respect
to such vessels and cargoes in foreign courts.
Despite the disappointing lack of wide acceptance of the
provisions of the Brussels Convention, its current validity
and its potential value for helping to regularize the maritime
aspects of the sovereign immunity problem has been demonstrated
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as recently as 1957 when the Inter-American Bar Association
151
resolved to encourage states to ratify it.
2. Continuing Interest in Codification
Codification hopes received further encouragement
following the Brussels Convention when in 1927 the League of
Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification
of International Law took up the subject of the competence
of courts in regard to foreign states. Questionnaires which
were sent by the committee to numerous states disclosed that
although many states had important reservations, most states
did favor codification in principle. ~"- Thereafter, the
Harvard Research undertook to prepare a comprehensive draft
convention.
The 1932 Harvard Research Draft Convention on Competence
of Courts in Regard to Foreign States dealt with the broad
commercial and proprietary aspects of sovereign immunity and
went far toward restating the restrictive concept in precise
and easily understandable terms. For distinguishing immune and
non-immune governmental activities, article 11 provided:
A State may be made a respondent in a proceeding
in a court of another state when, in the territory
of such other state, it engages in an industrial,
commercial, financial, or other business enterprise
in which private persons may there engage, or does
an act there in connection with such an enterprise
wherever conducted, and the proceeding is based upon
the conduct of such enterprise or upon such act.
The foregoing provision shall not be construed
to allow a State to be made a respondent in a proceed-
ing relating to its public debt. 153
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In 1949 the United Nations International Law Commission
placed the question of jurisdiction over foreign states and
their property in a position of relatively high priority on its
list of topics to be codified. J^ The commission's work on
this subject has been reflected in a limited way in the 1958
155Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
The commission reaffirmed its interest in this general subject
in 1962, 56 but, unfortunately, further results of this interest
have not yet been forthcoming.
3. Territorial Sea Convention
The problem of immunities of vessels in respect to
foreign judicial jurisdiction was treated in section III of
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone in the context of the right of innocent passage of
vessels through foreign territorial waters. ~" Sub-section A
(articles 14 through 17) prescribes general rules of innocent
passage applicable to all ships. Sub-section B (articles 18
through 20) prescribes additional rules applicable to merchant
ships. The pertinent article of sub-section B, article 20,
recognizes in the following terms a limited right of a coastal
state to exercise judicial authority over foreign merchant
vessels within its territorial waters:
1. The coastal State should not stop or divert
a foreign ship passing through the territorial sea
for the purpose of exercising civil jurisdiction
in relation to a person on board the ship.
2. The coastal State may not levy execution
against or arrest the ship for the purpose of any
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civil proceedings, save only in respect of obliaa-tionsor liabilities assumed or incurred by theship itself in the course or for the purpose ofits voyage through the waters of the coastal State.
i.™ fri^t Provifions of the previous paragraphare without prejudice to the right of the coastal
?£« - ln aJcordance with its laws, to levy execu-tion against or to arrest, for purposes of any civilproceedings a foreign ship lying in the territorialsea, or passing through the territorial sea afterleaving internal waters.
Article 21 provides that the above-quoted provisions
apply as well to government vessels operated for commercial
purposes, and article 22 exempts government vessels operated
for non-commercial purposes from those provisions. The net
effect is to equate government commercial vessels to private
merchant vessels for purposes of amenability to civil judicial
process for limited classes of claims while in the territorial
sea of a foreign state. Absolute jurisdictional immunity of
warships and other government vessels operated for non-
commercial purposes is left intact.
The United States objected to the inclusion of any
limitation on the competence of a coastal state to exercise
jurisdiction in respect to private and governmental vessels
within its territorial waters,^ but it has subsequently
ratified the Convention without reservations. 159 A more
serious objection was made by Rumania on behalf of the Soviet
Bloc with regard to the provisions which authorize a coastal
state to exercise a measure of judicial authority over
foreign governmental' commercial vessels without the flag
state's consent. 160 All Soviet Bloc states which have ratified
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the Convention have registered reservations on that account, *«
to which the United states has objected. 162
While narrow in their operational scope and totally
rejected by the Soviet Bloc, the relevant provisions of the
Territorial Sea Convention may be taken as indication of
support for the restrictive concept on part of the more than
fifty states whose concurrence was required to include them
in the Convention. 163
C. PROSPECTIVE ROLES OF THE
MAJOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Leading Western Countries
Despite hopeful signs that the idea of multilateral
codification of restrictive immunity policies is gradually
gaining an effective base of support in the international
community, this approach has thus far not succeeded for some
important reasons. I„ the first place, relatively few states
have shown concerted willingness to commit themselves unequiv-
ocally to restrictive policies in the external arena.
Symptomatically, there has been no sustained effort to regularize
immunity policies in a broad scope-there have been only
sporadic codification attempts concerning narrow aspects of
the problem.
Indefiniteness of purpose on part of leading Western
countries undoubtedly has contributed heavily to the insuffi-
ciency of past codification efforts. Such indefiniteness
has been most clearly evident on part of the United states
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and the United Kingdom, both of which have failed to sign
the Brussels Convention and the latter of which has not yet
adopted the restrictive concept in its decisional law. It
is submitted that the quantum of agreement which will be
required to establish a minimally effective system of inter-
national legal policies concerning governmental immunities
will be the consensus of the private trading segment of the
world community. It would appear that positive leadership
on part of the major industrial and commercial Western countries
will be practically indispensable to achieving even such a
minimally effective arrangement.
Although a definite American point of view began to
emerge after World War II, the United States has not yet
shown evidence of any strong desire for general codification.
It is to the credit of the United States that in the past
two decades it has shown willingness to promote the regulariza-
tion of restrictive policies in a less ambitious and less
conspicuous manner, however.
Since 1949 the United States has entered into at least
fourteen bilateral treaties or agreements concerning trade
or navigation wherein the parties have consented to the
mutual application of restrictive principles in terms which
are considerably clearer and more precise than the traditional
"I CA
decisional law language. The following is typical of the
relevant provisions contained in these agreements:
No enterprise of either Party, including corpor-
ations, associations, and government agencies and
instrumentalities, which is publicly owned or con-
trolled, shall, if it engages in commercial, manufac-
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turing, processing, shipping or other business
activities within the territories of the other
Party, claim or enjoy, either for itself or for
its property, immunity from taxation, suit,
execution of judgment or other liability to
which privately owned and controlled enterprises
are subject therein. 165
Although no such agreements have been concluded by the
United States with any Soviet Bloc countries, the post-war
treaty practice of the United States has undeniably advanced
the development of restrictive policies among the countries
within its own sphere of influence. The American influence
would be even better utilized in the future, however, if it
were directed toward obtaining comprehensive multilateral
codification
•
If the United Kingdom actually has a point of view in
the matter, it is difficult to ascertain it. Considering
that its domestic standards of governmental accountability are
comparable to those of the United States, the inertia of the
United Kingdom with respect to restricting immunities in the
international sphere is not easily understood. It can be
observed that the United Kingdom is probably the most extensively
nationalized of the leading Western states, and it might
therefore be speculated that there is some reluctance on part
of the United Kingdom to renounce the alleged right to claim
immunity on behalf of its state enterprises in foreign courts.
This is unfortunate, for in view of the prominence of the
United Kingdom in the international community almost any
decisive move on its part toward the adoption of restrictive
policies in the international sphere would significantly
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increase the momentum of the general restrictive trend.
In addition, the United Kingdom has a sphere of special
influence comprising the remnants of the Commonwealth and
some of the former Commonwealth members which in the past
have given obeiscance to the British example concerning
sovereign immunity questions.
Other major industrial and commercial VJestern countries,
the German Federal Republic, Japan, France, and Italy for
example, have shown receptiveness to restrictive principles.
In view of their eminence in world trade, their effectiveness
as exponents of codification could be quite great. Moreover,
as leaders in burgeoning East-West trade activities, they
are in a superior position to influence the Soviet Bloc in
this matter. 167
2. Soviet Union
Although it would appear possible to achieve a minimally
effective general codification arrangement with only the
concurrence of most of the private trading states, it seems
clear that the eventual achievement of an optimally effective
systemization of international immunity policies would require,
in addition, the assent of the state trading segment of the
world community. In particular, the assent of the Soviet
Union would be required.
There is a substantial identity of interests and
ideology between the Soviet Union and its satellites, and
the influence of the Soviet Union is possibly controlling




other matters. °° Consistently with its usual practice of
interpreting international law in a manner which would advance
its national interests and policies, the formal position
of the Soviet Union has continually been to press for retention
of the absolute concept of sovereign immunity as an international
policy. 169
The formal Soviet posture in this regard is clearly
illustrated by the reservations of the Soviet Bloc to the
provisions of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone which would authorize coastal states to
exercise limited judicial jurisdiction over state-owned
commercial vessels. ' w On the other hand, it will be seen
that the Soviet Union has repeatedly yielded to the realities
of international commerce and has made practical arrangements
to adapt to restrictive trends in the West and to meet in
many instances the minimal demands of Western traders for the
security of their commercial transactions. Having gone this
far when necessary as an expediency of the moment, however,
the Soviets have consistently refused to go the remaining
distance and to accept the restrictive concept in principle.
A critical question is then posed: in view of past
experiences, how is it now possible to envisage that there
will be more favorable prospects for obtaining Soviet assent
to the codification of restrictive immunity policies in the
future? A possible answer can be derived from analysis of the
nature and operations of Soviet foreign trade and the relation-




APPRAISAL OF SOVIET COMMITMENT
TO THE ABSOLUTE CONCEPT
A. IDENTIFICATION OF SOVIET SPECIAL INTERESTS
Under the Soviet Constitution, the conduct of foreign
trade is a function of the State and is defined as a state
monopoly.-1- /J - It was decreed in 1918:
All foreign trade is nationalized. Contracts
for the purchase or sale of all kinds of products(the products of mines, of industry, of agriculture
and others) with foreign governments or individual
enterprises abroad will be carried out in the name
of the Russian Republic by specially empowered or-
gans. Apart from these organs every contract for
trade, for purchase or sale abroad is forbidden. 172
In operation, the monopoly of the state comprises the "exclusive
right of the state to define all principal directions and
aspects of foreign trade activity, including the procedure
for distribution of the results of savings of social labor
derived from foreign trade." 173 The state's exclusive right
is implemented by direct state participation through govern-
mental bureaus, by indirect participation through trading
corporations created by the state, and by centralized planning
and control over exports, imports, and the commercial shipping




features of implementation include the establishment of currency
and price controls, allocation of trading rights among state
bureaus and state corporations, and detailed central control
of operations of all such organizations, including control
over the provisions of individual contracts .1 74
Ultimate control over foreign trade activities is vested
in the Council of Ministers, the supreme executive and
dispositive body of the Soviet Government, whose responsibility
includes coordination of internal and external economic policies
with the overall foreign policies and military policies of the
Soviet Union. Routine management and control of foreign trade
are vested in the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 17 ^
It can be concluded that the trading activities of the
'
Soviet State are thoroughly integrated organizationally with
other functions of the government which are of undisputed
sovereign character, i.e., the administrative, political, and
military functions. And there can be little doubt that foreign
trade is actually operated by the Soviets as an integral
component of the implementation of their international political,
military, and ideological objectives ,176 to Such an extent
^
perhaps, that the objective of economic gain is quite fre-
quently subordinated to the other objectives. 177
in contrast with private trading systems wherein economic
motivation is the predominant force, the foreign trade system
of the Soviet Union is most closely interfused with the
political and military bases of national power. Thus the matter
of protecting its foreign trade machinery from intimations of
possible foreign interference has assumed extraordinary
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importance to the Soviet Union. The relevant implications are
two-fold. In the first place, the complex character of Soviet
foreign trade activity provides uncommon motivation for the
Soviet Union to press for immunity in respect to its trade
machinery. In the second place, one cannot really think that
the conduct of foreign trade in the Soviet system is in fact
performed less as a sovereign function than are the political
and military activities of the state. Therefore, in the
context of theories which have typically been advanced as
bases for restricting immunities in international decisional
law, the complex character of Soviet trade gives theoretical
plausibility, if not rational persuasiveness, to its claims for
immunity in respect to its trade apparatus. '°
For many years it was a policy of the Soviet Union to
minimize trade relations with the non-communist world in order
to promote its economic autonomy, and the absolute concept of
sovereign immunity has been consistent with that policy.
Furthermore, there could be no strong public interest in the
Soviet Union for enabling citizens to sue foreign governments
in commercial matters since individuals and private concerns
are prohibited in the Soviet Union from transacting foreign
trade.
When the Soviet Union has departed from its isolationist
trade policy in order to benefit by the establishment of trade
relations with particular Western states, it has been required
as a practical reality to accommodate private traders* demands
for an efficient channel of redress to assure the stability
and security of trade transactions. In doing so, however,
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the Soviet Union has been careful to avoid compromising
permanently or in principle whatever standing it might have
to assert immunity on a broad international scale in respect
to its trade activities and property.
B. SOVIET CONCESSIONS TO WESTERN DEMANDS
1. Trade Delegations
Formerly, the principal means of Soviet implementation
of its foreign trade monopoly was through trade delegations
stationed abroad. ^^ Trade delegations, which continue to
operate on a diminished scale, are components of the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Trade to which they are directly respon-
181
sible. Their general functions are defined in the following
terms by a 1933 statute:
. . .
Trade representations of the USSR in
foreign states shall be agencies of the USSR, which
carry out abroad rights of the USSR in the sphere
of the monopoly of foreign trade belonging to it.
• • • [Tirade representations shall fulfill
the following tasks:
a) . . . represent the interests of the USSR
in the sphere of foreign trade and assist the devel-
opment of trade and other economic relations with
the [receiving state]. . . •
b) . . . regulate foreign trade of the USSR
with the [receiving state]. . . .
c) . . . carry out foreign trade of the USSR
with the [receiving state]. . . .182
Authority is given to a trade delegation by the statute
to conclude trade contracts and transactions on behalf of the
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Soviet Union,}- 83 to regulate and control all trade activities
between Soviet entities and the entities of the receiving
state, to perform foreign trade operations for Soviet trading
corporations,-1- 84 and to sue as plaintiff in foreign courts.-'- 8 ^
On the other hand, the statute restricts a trade delegation
to appearing as a defendant only in a suit in the receiving
state which arises from a trade transaction concluded by the
trade delegation in the receiving state, and then only where
the Soviet Government has by a treaty or a unilateral declara-
tion consented to suit against a trade delegation in the
receiving state in such cases. ^- 8 ^ As to all other suits, it
would be required by the statute that a trade delegation claim
187diplomatic immunity.
Although it is significant that the Soviet Union would
agree to any degree of local judicial control over trade
delegations, it can be observed that the provisions of the
statute do not compromise the Soviet position regarding the
absolute concept of sovereign immunity. The exercise of
jurisdiction by the receiving state would still depend upon
the prior consent of the Soviet Government. It can be observed
also that the Soviet Union has been unwilling to concede
under that arrangement more than the bare minimum of local
jurisdiction that would ordinarily be demanded by a Western
firm as a prerequisite to concluding a trade transaction with
a trade delegation.
The Soviet position concerning the immunities of trade
delegations would still disallow the exercise of jurisdiction
by a receiving state in three important classes of suits:
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actions respecting trade contracts concluded by a trade
delegation outside the receiving state in which suit is brought;
actions respecting trade contracts concluded by Soviet organiza-
tions other than trade delegations; and tort actions and actions
on contracts other than trade contracts. The Soviet Government
has, however, been able to conclude a number of bilateral
treaties whereby Western states have accepted the jurisdic-
tional limits required by the statute.
Objections to the insufficiency of Soviet concessions of
local jurisdiction over trade delegations appear to have been
partly responsible for the United States* refusal to receive
1 RR
a delegation. °° Such objections also appear to be implicit
in decisions of French courts which at times have upheld the
exercise of local jurisdiction over the Soviet Trade Delegation
in France in suits on contracts concluded outside of France
by other Soviet organizations, notwithstanding the existence
of a Franco-Soviet treaty containing jurisdictional limitations
189
of the kind which have been referred to.
Another difficulty with the Soviet position concerning
the immunities of trade delegations is that the Soviet Union
has been increasingly unwilling to subject its property to the
processes of local courts. It is noted that the Soviet
statute concerning trade delegations is silent in this regard,
apparently in order to leave the question open to negotiation
in the formation of individual treaties. In the agreement
whereby a trade delegation was received by the United Kingdom
in 1930, jurisdiction over all Soviet property within the
United Kingdom, except for property necessary for the exercise
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of rights of sovereignty and consular and diplomatic property,
was conceded broadly to the process of British courts in
disputes arising from commercial transactions concluded by
the trade delegation within the United Kingdom. A contrast
is noted in connection with a similar treaty executed by the
Soviet Union and the German Federal Republic in 1958, when
the Soviet bargaining power had undoubtedly improved. In
the latter treaty, the scope of the Soviet property which was
made subject to execution by German courts was more restrictively
delimited, and all Soviet property of whatever kind was exempted
191from interim attachments.
It is relevant to note also that other Soviet Bloc
countries use trade delegation systems patterned on the
Soviet model and that each of these countries accords full
192jurisdictional immunity to others* trade delegations. ^
Although the trade delegation device is still widely
used by the Soviet Union, the role of a trade delegation in
the actual execution of individual trade transactions appears
to have been reduced in practice to that of agent and guarantor
for contracts executed by Soviet trading corporations and
enterprises of the receiving state. Through the establishment
of a system of state corporations as its primary mode for
conduct of foreign trade, the Soviet Union has gone still
further toward adapting to the restrictive immunity policies
of the West—and still without derogation of its position in
support of the absolute concept of sovereign immunity.
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2. State Trading Corporations
It is claimed by the Soviets that virtually all of the
foreign trade of the Soviet Union, 95 per cent of its exports
and nearly 100 per cent of its imports, is now conducted
193by about fifty state trading corporations. These are
state-ovmed organizations or governmental agencies which have
been clothed with a special commercial status. Each is
established by a separate charter which creates it as an
independent entity and which defines its powers and permissible
194
spheres of operations. " Their spheres of operations are
allocated to them in terms of particular products or territories
195
over which they have monopoly rights.
Both the Soviet internal law and- the charters of state
trading corporations carefully distinguish between the trading
corporations and the state by conferring legal autonomy
upon the corporations and specifying that transactions concluded
by them are binding only upon them. ^ D They are not immune
from suit in the Soviet Union, nor are claims of immunity now
asserted in their behalf in foreign countries in suits arising
197from commercial transactions. Inasmuch as both the civil
law courts and the common law courts of the West have had
relatively little difficulty in establishing jurisdictional
bases in respect to governmental corporations which are
198
organizationally separate entities, the Soviet concession
in this respect consists not so much of its disclaimer of
immunity on behalf of state trading corporations as of its




The institutional structure of the Soviet trading
corporations is apparently calculated to serve dual purposes
in Soviet foreign trade operations. First, the legal separation
from the government is conducive to expansion of trade by
promoting among foreign traders the expectation that sovereign
immunity will not be asserted in defense of suits against
the corporations. Second, the separation lends credibility
to Soviet claims that foreign assets of the government cannot
lawfully be charged with obligations created by trading corpor-
ations and that the assets of a corporation are similarly
not chargeable for obligations of the government or of other
corporations. The latter problem has been a troublesome one
for the Soviet Union, for some Western courts, apparently
assuming that in the Soviet Union all commercial property is
ultimately owned by the state and that the Soviet foreign
trade monopoly is functionally indivisible, have exercised
jurisdiction over property of some Soviet entities on account
of the obligations of some others. "
3. Arbitration Agreements
Increased emphasis upon arbitration has been another
significant method by which the Soviet Union has attempted
to adapt its foreign trading practices to accommodate demands
of Western traders for an efficient means of institutional
settlement of commercial disputes. Arbitration clauses are,
of course, usual provisions in international commercial
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contracts , and they are widely used now in the foreign trade
operations of the Soviet Union and other Soviet Bloc states. 200
In negotiations with Western business firms, it has
become usual for Soviet trade organizations to attempt to
obtain assent to the inclusion of contractual provisions
whereby disputes would be submitted to arbitration. To this
end, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade has constituted a
Maritime Arbitration Commission to consider disputes arising
from maritime carriage contracts and a Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission to consider disputes arising from other classes
of commercial contracts. Soviet trade organizations usually
attempt to persuade the Western traders with whom they deal
to designate the appropriate one of the Soviet arbital bodies
in their contracts. Although the Soviet commissions are said
to enjoy a favorable reputation for fairness and impartiality,
and their awards are usually subject to the supervision of
Soviet courts, Western traders sometimes balk at submitting
their disputes to the Soviet commissions. In such instances,
Soviet trading organizations are often willing to agree to
arbitration in another country, frequently Sweden or Switzer-
land. 201
Arbitration agreements have their, primary importance
in relation to sovereign immunity where they are contained
in contracts to which trade delegations are committed, for,
as indicated above, it is unlikely that immunity claims will
be asserted on behalf of Soviet trading corporations. The
1958 Soviet treaty with the Federal German Republic, to which
reference has previously been made, provides that arbitration
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clauses of commercial contracts concluded or guaranteed by
the Trade Delegation in Germany will obviate the right of
recourse to German courts in suits on such contracts . ^02
It can be observed therefore, that the Soviet Union has fully
recognized the value of the arbitration device as an alternative
for the avoidance of sovereign immunity confrontations in
foreign countries.
C. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS
It is evident from the foregoing that the Soviet Union
has not in recent times regarded the right to assert sovereign
immunity on behalf of its foreign trade apparatus as indispen-
sable for its mode of conduct of trade. To the contrary,
it has entered into bilateral agreements with individual
Western states whereby it has consented to the exercise of
foreign judicial jurisdiction over its trading instrumentalities
in important classes of cases, and it has adjusted the institu-
tional structure of its foreign trade instrumentalities in
such a manner as to practically accommodate the restrictive
immunity policies of the West and the demands of private
traders for legal protection of transactions. Furthermore,
Soviet trade instrumentalities have made wide use of practices
which have enabled them to practically eliminate sovereign
immunity issues from many transactions. Yet the Soviet Union
has not quit its advocacy of the absolute concept.
By its use of the devices which have been examined
previously in this chapter, the Soviet Union has only waived
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in a limited sphere its alleged right to claim immunity on
behalf of its trade instrumentalities, or else it has only made
practical arrangements for the avoidance of sovereign immunity
confrontations. It has, in other words, kept its options open
by carefully preserving its position, and in effect it has
reserved the standing to invoke immunity in respect to its
trading activities and property in other instances and at other
places and times when it might appear to be in the national
interest to do so.
One important implication of this has to do with the
nature of Soviet foreign trade and its functions as an economic
weapon in the cold war arsenal. The potential value of foreign
trade for this purpose was not exploited by the Soviets until
about the end of the Stalinist era. Prior to that time the
foreign trade monopoly was conceived of by the Soviet Union as
having a principally defensive economic function of helping to
protect against "coordinated foreign policy directed against
the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries by imperialist
203
countries through integrated capitalist monopolies."
By the end of the Stalinist period the economy of the
Soviet Eloc had developed sufficiently to enable its foreign
trade monopolies to be deployed offensively toward neutralizing
the Western-oriented nations, breaking up the alliances of
the United States, and drawing unaligned countries and less
developed countries into the Soviet sphere of influence.
On the United States' part there were imposed special anti-
?os
communist trade restrictions by legislative enactment, and
by promulgation of a system of executive policy controls.
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Somewhat similar to the latter was the executive policy decision
to adopt the restrictive policy of sovereign immunity.
Dominant United States policy assumptions from that time to
the present have been that economic dealings which would
increase Soviet Bloc power relative to the West should be
avoided and that foreign trade might be used by the Soviet Union
to cause economic injury to a Western trading partner for
political purposes. ^°
There can be little hope that the Soviet Union would be
easily persuaded to give up its carefully guarded sovereign
immunity options at a time when there is tension and unpredic-
tability in East-West trade relations generally and mutual
suspicion and hostility in Soviet-American trade relations
in particular. If, however, some recent indications of an
increasingly favorable commercial climate and signs of growing
interest in Soviet trade within the American business and
political communities eventually materialize in the establishment
of trade relations in which commercial considerations control
over national political and military objectives,^ it will then
be reasonable to hope for achieving Soviet assent to codification
of restrictive sovereign immunity policies. Apart from the
moral advantages and the world opinion advantages that it might
gain by doing so, there could be practical advantages—such as
the promotion of the confidence of prospective trading partners.
There is yet another important implication to be drawn
from the analysis in this chapter, and it is that from the
Soviet viewpoint the issue of sovereign immunity is negotiable.
The fact that the Soviet Union has given treaty consent to
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the exercise of limited foreign judicial jurisdiction in the
past shows that it is sometimes willing to trade away its
claims to immunity concerning its commercial activities.
On the other hand, the tenacity with which the Soviet Union has
preserved its claims in regard to the absolute concept of
sovereign immunity gives ample assurance that it will not give
away its alleged right without requiring in return some important
concessions which will serve to protect the Soviet foreign trade
apparatus from the risk of unlimited foreign judicial control.

VI.
OUTLOOK FOR ACHIEVING AN
EFFECTIVE CONSENSUS
A « PROJECTIONS ON CURRENT TRENDS ;
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. The Minimal Effective Order
It has been shown in this study that the absolute
concept of sovereign immunity is insupportable from any useful
analytical perspective as an international legal policy. Since
it operates to protect all the activities of governments from
any responsibility to private claimants, it is incompatible
with the prevalent juridical standards of accountability of
states in their domestic arenas—-including even domestic law
standards of the Soviet Union, which is the leading positive
proponent of the absolute concept in the international arena,
and the domestic standards of states such as the United Kingdom
which possibly have merely failed to renounce the absolute
concept in the external sphere for lack of a strong point of
view in the matter. The concept is also inconsistent with the
underlying social value expectations upon which the domestic
juridical standards can be presumed to be based.




relations perspective to avoid affronting other states are
negatived by considering, among other things, that it is an
affront to the forum state to prevent its courts from adjudi-
cating important classes of private law controversies in which
the forum has substantial and legitimate concern. Furthermore,
the private trading countries which comprise the larger segment
of the world trading community, have important national political
and economic interests in maintaining juridical equality between
their principal instruments of foreign commerce,, private traders,
and the instrumentalities of rival state trading systems.
The restrictive concept of sovereign immunity has
advanced widely in Western countries as an alternative to the
absolute concept. Essentially it is a compromise policy which
eliminates the strongest objections which are made to the
absolute concept, for it makes states accountable in foreign
courts in most instances which give rise to private claims,
i.e., states' commercial transactions. It is generally support-
able as an international legal policy because it substantially
accords with the prevalent juridical standards of accountability
of states in their domestic arenas, and it serves to balance
states 1 community interests in protecting their common govern-
mental functions from intolerable foreign interference. The
fact that there apparently have not been instances of formal
diplomatic protests or of interruptions of friendly relations
among states on account of the exercise of civil judicial
jurisdiction over the commercial activities or property of
foreign states has shown that restrictive immunity principles
are generally tolerable from a foreign relations perspective. 1°
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Although the restrictive concept is subject to the
criticism that it still permits immunity to be granted in some
instances at the expense of claimants' private legal rights,
it is shown that the restrictive concept is the most liberal
immunity policy which is likely to be supported by the consensus
of the world community in the foreseeable future. However,
the restrictive concept is not yet a fully workable inter-
national legal policy. Though it has been applied in the deci-
sional law of numerous Western countries, there has been a
notable lack of uniformity among the decisions. This is attrib-
utable in part to the tendencies of decision-makers to decide
international immunity claims by reference to their domestic
precedents and their tendencies to use difficult and highly
abstract methodologies in this matter. It is also attributable
in part to the limited competence of decision-makers of
individual states to make policies which are widely authorita-
tive in the international sphere. Furthermore, among the
states which have followed the restrictive concept there has
been little definiteness or uniformity concerning collateral
questions such as service of process upon representatives of
foreign states, attachment of states 1 property and vessels,
and levy on such property and vessels to execute judgments.
Moreover, it is not always clear among these states that the
juridical principles and the values which are at stake always
prevail over foreign relations expediencies in affecting
decisions.
Although it would appear that the basic policies and
many of the details of implementation could be clarified
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through multilateral treaty codification, there has been
surprisingly little effort in this direction and a disappoint-
ing lack of leadership among major Western countries in this
regard. Therefore, though there now appears to be a consensus
of Western countries in favor of the restrictive concept, it
is an inchoate consensus and not yet an effective one.
It is contended that world legal order would be
significantly advanced by a concerted effort merely on the
part of the private trading states to achieve broad systemiza-
tion of uniform and workable immunity policies, for difficult
problems have been attributable to the extensive involvement
of governments in international commercial and economic affairs
as well as to their less extensive state trading ventures. It
can be observed that at least fourteen Western countries have
supported limited codification in connection with the Brussels
Convention and that five of these same states and nine others
have recently entered into bilateral agreements with the
United States which particularized a basic rule of immunity
211based upon restrictive principles. A In addition, numerous
states approved the codification of a very narrow immunity
issue which was treated from a restrictive approach in the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
It can be concluded, therefore, that there are now good prospects
for obtaining the assent of the great majority of private
trading countries in regard to multilateral codification of




For such a system to be of optimal effectiveness,
however, it would have to embrace the state trading segment
of the international community. This would turn largely upon
the assent of the Soviet Union, a country which has continually
contended for the absolute concept.
There are strong reasons why the Soviet Union has
adhered to the absolute concept. For one thing, the Soviet
foreign trade monopoly has been operated as an integral part
of the machinery for implementation of over-all national
political, military, and ideological objectives, and the Soviet
Union thus has an uncommonly strong motive for protecting its
trade apparatus from the risk of foreign interference or control.
A dominant Soviet policy in times past has been to isolate
the national economy from the capitalist economic systems, and
the absolute concept was consistent with that policy. Moreover,
since private Soviet businessmen are barred from engaging in
foreign trade, the Soviet Union is not appreciably concerned
with enabling its nationals to sue foreign governments in
commercial matters.
Nevertheless, when the Soviet Union has found it
necessary or expedient to trade with the West it has practically
accommodated Western traders* requirements for an efficient
means to enforce their transactions. Although in doing this
the Soviet Union has never compromised its arguments for
retention of the absolute concept, Soviet practice does show
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that the right to claim immunity in commercial matters is not
considered by the Soviet Union to be indispensable for protect-
ing its trade apparatus. In addition, it shows that the Soviet
Union is often willing to bargain concerning immunities.
In recent years the Soviet Union and its satellites
have adopted policies which tend to favor active trade with
the West, and there are indications that economic motivation
is coming to the fore in Soviet policy-making. Depending,
of course, on other unpredictable events occurring in the
course of East-West relations, it seems entirely conceivable
that the Soviet Union soon will determine it to be in the
national interest to enter the mainstream of world trade with
the primary objective of receiving economic gain. In that
event it would be beneficial to accept restrictive immunity
policies in principle in order to promote the trust of Western
trading partners and thereby compete more effectively in world
commerce. It can therefore be concluded that there is favorable
prospect for achieving Soviet assent to restrictive immunity
policies in the foreseeable future; this conclusion is
strengthened by considering that the general trend of world
opinion seems to be overwhelmingly toward -restricting foreign
states' immunities.
There is a caveat: it seems certain that the Soviet
Union would insist upon a significant quid pro quo . Specifically,
in exchange for giving any form of blanket consent for the
exercise of foreign judicial authority in respect to its
commercial activities, it is predictable that the Soviet Union
would demand the inclusion of safeguards which would assure
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against abuse of judicial processes and to guard against the
deprivation of important state property. To protect the state
from indiscriminate suit, for example, some forum non conveniens
test or substantial connections test might have to be developed.
Also some new procedures might be needed to guard against the
loss or prolonged deprivation of important state property or
of a vessel. On the other hand, there are respected authorities
in the West who consider such safeguards to be desirable in any
event. ' Furthermore, it can be noted in regard to the latter
requirement that the United States has long had a procedure for
giving bond or pledging its credit to effect the release of its
213
vessels which are attached abroad.
B. RECOMMENDED POLICIES
There can be observed to be a continuing inclination on
the part of American courts and jurists to philosophize over
the restrictive concept of sovereign immunity and to propound
new theoretical grounds for distinguishing the immune and
non-immune activities of foreign states. Hence, in recent
years there have been advanced in the United States some new
theories, such as a test which is apparently analagous the
"act of state" doctrine, 14 and a distinction between the
essential and the nonessential activities of states. ^ While
the proponents • concern for improving the restrictive concept
of sovereign immunity is well justified, it is doubtful from
a practical viewpoint that these theories are substantially
better than the highly abstract and uncertain traditional
tests which they would replace.
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Rather than to devote their intellectual labors to the
formulation of new theoretical -grounds which might produce
more restrictive but not more predictable results than the
traditional theories, it would be better from a practical
point of view for jurists to give the courts more objective
and workable rules of decision by consolidating, refining,
and improving the effectiveness of the restrictive immunity
policies which are presently in wide use in other countries.
This appears to have been the approach of the few multilateral
treaty efforts which have been undertaken concerning sovereign
immunity, and altogether it is the more plausible approach for
obtaining uniformity in the law.
It is the political branch of the United States Govern-
ment, however, which has the greatest opportunity to lead in
the refinement and regularization of restrictive immunity
policies—a field in which the political branch has not
heretofore excelled. A decisive step in this direction would
be to apply the restrictive concept consistently in suggestions
to the courts in future cases. A possible further step toward
assuming leadership in this matter would be to secure the
United States* adherence to the Brussels Convention—an action
which would set a favorable example for other states.
Moreover, the considerable influence of the United
States would be well employed if used to persuade other states
to join with it in the general codification of restrictive
sovereign immunity policies. It can be hoped in this regard
that the United States will constructively and positively
support the codification efforts of the United Nations
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International Lav; Commission. It is further to be hoped that
the United States will be receptive to the inclusion of such
reasonable methods and procedures as vzould reduce the risk of
unnecessary interference with commercial activities and
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